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Abstract
Special relativity states that information cannot travel faster than the speed of
light, which means that communication between agents occupying distinct locations
incurs some minimal delay. Alternatively, we can see it as temporary communication
constraints between distinct agents and such constraints turn out to be useful for
cryptographic purposes. In relativistic cryptography we consider protocols in which
interactions occur at distinct locations at well-defined times and we investigate why
such a setting allows to implement primitives which would not be possible otherwise.
Relativistic cryptography is closely related to non-communicating models, which
have been extensively studied in theoretical computer science. Therefore, we start
by discussing non-communicating models and its applications in the context of in-
teractive proofs and cryptography. We find which non-communicating models might
be useful for the purpose of bit commitment, propose suitable bit commitment pro-
tocols and investigate their limitations. We explain how some non-communicating
models can be justified by special relativity and study what consequences such a
translation brings about. In particular, we present a framework for analysing secu-
rity of multiround relativistic protocols. We show that while the analysis of classical
protocols against classical adversaries is tractable, the case of quantum protocols or
quantum adversaries in a classical protocol constitutes a significantly harder task.
The second part of the thesis is dedicated to analysing specific protocols. We
start by considering a recently proposed two-round quantum bit commitment pro-
tocol. We start by proving security under the assumption that idealised devices
(single-photon source, perfect detectors) are available. Then, we propose a fault-
tolerant variant of the protocol which can be implemented using realistic devices
(weak-coherent source, noisy and inefficient detectors) and present a security anal-
ysis which takes into account losses, errors, multiphoton pulses, etc. We also report
on an experimental implementation performed in collaboration with an experimental
group at the University of Geneva.
In the last part we focus on classical schemes. We start by analysing a known
two-round classical protocol and we show that successful cheating is equivalent to
winning a certain non-local game. This is interesting as it demonstrates that even
if the protocol is entirely classical, it might be advantageous for the adversary to
v
use quantum systems. We also propose a new, multiround classical bit commitment
protocol and prove its security against classical adversaries. The advantage of the
multiround protocol is that it allows us to increase the commitment time without
changing the locations of the agents. This demonstrates that in the classical world
an arbitrary long commitment can be achieved even if the agents are restricted to
occupy a finite region of space. Moreover, the protocol is easy to implement and we
discuss an experiment performed in collaboration with the Geneva group.
We conclude with a brief summary of the current state of knowledge on relativis-
tic cryptography and some interesting open questions that might lead to a better
understanding of the exact power of relativistic models.
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Symbol Meaning
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|φ〉, |ψ〉 pure quantum states
ρ, σ mixed quantum states
|Ψd〉 maximally entangled state of dimension d
H Hadamard matrix
|| · ||p Schatten p-norm
|| · || Schatten ∞-norm
tr trace
trA partial trace over A
Φ quantum channel
id identity channel
wH(·) Hamming weight
dH(·) Hamming distance
⊕ exclusive-OR (XOR)
∗ finite-field multiplication
Pr[·] probability
〈·, ·〉 inner product
X ,Y finite alphabets
Fq finite field of order q
Pk kth player (in a multiplayer game)
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Quantum cryptography lies at the intersection of physics and computer science. It
brings together different communities and makes for a lively and exciting environ-
ment. It demonstrates that the fundamental principles of quantum physics can be
cast and studied using the operational approach of cryptography. Besides, thanks
to recent technological advances, practical applications are just round the corner.
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of quantum cryptography the relevant back-
ground knowledge spans multiple fields, which makes it particularly difficult to pro-
vide an introduction which would be both complete and concise. We have, therefore,
chosen to focus on the topics which are directly related to quantum cryptography
and skip over the less relevant areas.
This chapter starts with a short introduction to cryptography, which is the study
of exchanging and processing information in a secure fashion. We focus on two-
party (or mistrustful) cryptography, whose goal is to protect the privacy of an
honest party interacting with potentially dishonest partners. Then, we introduce
quantum information theory, which studies how quantum systems can be used to
store and process information. We discuss the main features that distinguish it
from the classical information theory and briefly describe the early history of the
field. The next part of this chapter brings the two topics together under the name
of quantum cryptography. We give a brief account of its early days, again, with a
particular focus on two-party cryptography. We finish by giving a brief outline of
this thesis.
1.1 Cryptography
Cryptography has been around ever since rulers of ancient tribes realised the need
to send secret (or private) messages. Ideally, such messages should reveal no in-
formation if intercepted by an unauthorised party. The solution to this problem
is known as a cipher, which is simply a procedure for converting a secret message
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(called the plaintext) into another message (called the ciphertext), which should be
intelligible to a friend (who knows the particular cipher we are using) but should
give no information to an enemy. The first confirmed accounts of simple ciphers
come from ancient Greece and Rome, for example Julius Caesar used a simple shift
cipher (now also known as a Caesar cipher) to ensure privacy of his correspondence.
Until modern times designing practical (i.e. easy to implement and difficult to break)
ciphers was essentially the only branch of cryptography. One such cipher known as
the one-time pad was invented by Gilbert S. Vernam and Joseph O. Mauborgne
in 1917.1 While the one-time pad guarantees (provably) secure communication it
requires the two parties to share a random string of bits, known as a key, which is
as long as the message they want to send. This quickly becomes impractical if the
parties want to exchange large amounts of data.
A report presented by Claude Shannon in 1945 marks the birth of modern cryp-
tography [Sha49].2 Shannon proposed a formal definition of a (perfectly) secure
cipher and proved that one-time pad satisfies such a stringent requirement. More-
over, he proved that any cipher that guarantees perfect security requires the key to
be as long as the message (which essentially means that the one-time pad cannot be
improved). But the contributions of this work go well beyond encryption and the
analysis of one-time pad, as it was the first time that cryptography was phrased in
the rigorous language of mathematics. This put cryptography on equal footing with
other established sciences and set the stage for information theory (discovered by
Shannon a couple of years later).
Nowadays cryptography is a mature field within which hundreds of cryptographic
tasks (or primitives) have been defined and studied (and encryption, while obviously
very important, is just one of them). Except for purely practical reasons for study-
ing these tasks there is also a deeper motivation. Certain questions in cryptography
(e.g. finding sufficient assumptions to perform a given task or proving impossibil-
ity results) give us valuable and operational insight into the underlying information
theory. While classical information theory is relatively well understood, its quantum
counterpart is not. That is why studying quantum cryptography is an important
pursuit and contributes towards our understanding of the quantum world we (prob-
ably) live in.
In this thesis we only consider a branch of cryptography known as two-party
or mistrustful cryptography, in which two parties, usually referred to as Alice and
Bob, want to perform a certain task together but since they do not fully trust
1Note, however, that ideas that the one-time pad hinges on appeared as early as 1882 in a book
by Frank Miller. For details consult an interesting survey on the state of cryptography at the turn
of the century by Bellovin [Bel11].
2This work, presented in 1945 as a classified report at Bell Telephone Labs, was declassified and
published in 1949.
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each other they want to minimise the amount of information revealed during the
protocol. A simple example of such a scenario is themillionaires’ problem introduced
by Andrew Yao [Yao82], in which two millionaires want to find out who is richer
without revealing their actual wealth. This is certainly an interesting problem and,
in fact, one that we often face in our everyday lives. Below we present and motivate
some other natural two-party tasks.
• Example 1: Alice uses an online movie service called Bob, which charges
separately for every downloaded movie. Alice has paid for one movie and
wants to download it but being paranoid about privacy she is reluctant to
reveal her choice to Bob. On the other hand, Bob wants to make sure that
Alice only downloads one movie (and not more) so he is not keen on giving her
access to the entire database. This problem, called oblivious transfer 3, turns
out to be a convenient building block for two-party cryptography. In fact, it
can be used to construct any other two-party primitive [Kil88].
• Example 2: Alice has supernatural powers that allow her to predict the
future, for example the results of tomorrow’s draw of the national lottery. She
wants to impress Bob (she likes to be admired) but she does not want him to
get rich (she knows that money does not bring happiness). Hence, the goal
is to commit to a message without actually revealing it until some later time.
Such primitives are known as commitment schemes [Blu81, BCC88]4 and the
simplest one, in which the committed message is just one bit, is called bit
commitment and constitutes one of the main topics of this thesis.
• Example 3: Alice is a quantum hacker and throughout the years she has
exposed dozens of improperly formulated security proofs and misguided calcu-
lations. Having realised the damage done to the quantum community she has
contacted a law enforcement agency represented by Bob to negotiate turning
herself in. Alice and Bob want to schedule a secret meeting but for obvious
security reasons they want to make sure that the location is chosen in a truly
random fashion. In other words, Alice and Bob want to agree on a random
choice, which neither of them can bias (or predict it in advance). This primitive
known as coin tossing (or coin flipping) was introduced by Blum [Blu81].
3Oblivious transfer comes in multiple flavours and the one described above is called 1-out-of-
N oblivious transfer, where N ≥ 2 is the total number of movies offered by Bob. Since we are
only interested in fundamental possibility or impossibility results, studying the case of N = 2 is
sufficient (it is known how to interconvert these primitives including even more exotic variants like
Rabin oblivious transfer [Cré88]).
4Blum [Blu81] only implicitly mentions commitment schemes while Brassard, Chaum and Cré-
peau [BCC88] define them explicitly. See an encyclopedia entry on commitment schemes for more
details [Cré11].
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All these tasks produce conflicting interests between Alice and Bob. It is clear
that security for either party can be ensured at the cost of leaving the other party
completely unprotected. In case of oblivious transfer, for example, Alice could give
up her privacy and simply announce which movie she wants to watch. Alternatively,
Bob could provide Alice with the entire database, hoping that she will not abuse his
trust.
The goal of two-party cryptography is to first come up with the right math-
ematical definition of these primitives and then find in what circumstances and
under what assumptions they can (or cannot) be implemented. It is also interest-
ing to study reductions between different primitives, i.e. how to use one primitive
to implement another one, which leads to a resource theory for cryptography. For
example, oblivious transfer can be used to implement commitment schemes because
choosing a particular message can be interpreted as committing to its label. Com-
mitment schemes, on the other hand, can be used to generate trusted randomness.
For example, in order to generate one trusted bit we use a commitment scheme with
two possible values (such a primitive is known as bit commitment). Alice commits
to a bit a, then Bob announces bit b and finally Alice reveals a and the outcome of
the coin toss is declared to be a⊕ b. As long as at least one of the parties is honest
the resulting bit is uniform. The use of a commitment scheme ensures that b does
not depend on a (which would allow Bob to cheat).
The holy grail of the field is the so-called information-theoretic security5. There,
the basic assumption is that the dishonest party is restricted by the underlying
information theory, which is arguably the weakest assumption that one needs to
perform security analysis. The term information-theoretic security goes back to
Shannon (e.g. see his definition of secure encryption [Sha49]).
Unfortunately, it turns out that two-party primitives cannot be implemented
with information-theoretic security (for both parties) unless we make some further
assumptions.6 Below we give a brief overview of various (reasonable) assumptions
that make information-theoretically secure two-party cryptography possible.
• Trusted third-party : The trivial solution is to introduce a trusted third-
party, which implements the primitive for Alice and Bob. In the paranoid
5Some authors prefer to use the term unconditional security instead. The name is motivated
by the fact that the security proof assumes nothing about the adversary. However, this has been
criticised as every security model contains assumptions and no security statement can be proven
without referring to them.
6While the impossibility is usually intuitive showing it formally requires some effort. As an
example we present an informal argument why oblivious transfer is not possible with information-
theoretic security. Consider the situation at the end of the protocol. If Bob is not able to deduce
which movie Alice chose to download, it must be the case that the knowledge contained in the
interaction is sufficient to reconstruct at least two different movies and nothing can stop Alice from
doing that.
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world, in which Alice and Bob trust nobody but themselves, this is not a
satisfactory solution. Moreover, it makes all tasks trivially possible.
• Pre-shared resources : Another solution that allows for two-party cryptog-
raphy is to equip Alice and Bob with some shared correlations. This could
be either shared randomness [Riv99] or access to a source of inherent and un-
predictable noise that allows to generate such correlations during the protocol
[Cré97, WNI03].7
• Technological limitations : The standard real-world solution to the com-
mitment task is for Alice to lock her message in a safe box, which she then
hands over to Bob while keeping the key. Whenever Alice wants to reveal
the message, she gives the key to Bob, who opens the safe box and reads the
message. This is secure as long as Alice has no way of remotely modifying
the message and Bob has no tools to open the safe box, i.e. we must assume
that they are subject to certain technological limitations. One can also assume
that their “digital technology” is limited, e.g. by restricting their computational
power or storage capabilities, which again makes secure two-party cryptogra-
phy possible. The former leads to the rich and practically important field of
computational security8, while the latter leads to the bounded storage model
[Mau91].
• Communication constraints : It is well-known that interrogating suspects
one by one leads to better results than dealing with the whole group at the same
time. In the cryptographic language this corresponds to forcing one (or more)
parties to delegate agents, who perform certain parts of the protocol without
communicating. Such setting was originally introduced in complexity theory
under the name of multiprover models9 to evade certain impossibility results
[BGKW88]. These models are interesting from the cryptographic point of view
but we must be explicit how they are adjusted to fit the framework of standard
7Even for tasks whose only purpose is to generate trusted randomness like coin tossing this is
still a non-trivial scenario because the correlations initially shared between Alice and Bob might
be different from the ones we want to generate.
8Computational security relies on the assumption that the adversary cannot solve a certain
mathematical problem and let us mention two problematic aspects of this assumption. First of all,
our belief that some mathematical problems are difficult is based mainly on the fact that many
bright people have tried to solve them and failed (or maybe the successful ones prefer to keep
a low profile). An efficient algorithm for solving such problems might be announced tomorrow
and render all the currently used cryptographic protocols insecure. Secondly, most such schemes
are vulnerable to retroactive attacks. If a message sent today is required to remain secret for the
next twenty years, the mathematical problem must resist new algorithms and improved computing
power that might be developed in these twenty years. This is why we would like to ultimately drop
such assumptions and find more solid foundations for our cryptographic systems.
9To avoid confusion we talk about multiprover models in the context of complexity theory but
use the term multiagent in case of cryptographic protocols.
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two-party cryptography (in which there are only two parties interacting and
not more). On the bright side some types of non-communicating models can
(with subtle adjustments) be implemented by requiring multiple agents to
interact simultaneously at multiple locations (under the assumption that the
speed of light is finite). The first explicit examples of such relativistic protocols
came from Adrian Kent [Ken99, Ken05]. This field, now known as relativistic
cryptography, constitutes the main topic of this thesis.
1.2 Quantum information theory
As mentioned before the report written by Shannon in 1945 marks the beginning
of modern cryptography [Sha49]. Thinking about encryption and the one-time pad
led him to questions about the nature of information. Shannon’s next paper inves-
tigating fundamental limits of compression and transmission [Sha48] is considered
the beginning of (classical) information theory, which became an active field of re-
search with a wide range of practical implications. While the basic framework of
quantum mechanics already existed at the time (introduced in the 1920s and 30s
by Bohr, Born, de Broglie, Dirac, Einstein, Heisenberg, Planck, Schrödinger and
others), rigorous connections between the two were not established until much later.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen wrote a paper in which they argue that
quantum mechanics cannot be considered a complete theory [EPR35]. They postu-
late that for every measurement whose outcome is certain there exists an “element
of reality” and deduce that due to the uncertainty principle incompatible observ-
ables cannot have simultaneous elements of reality. On the other hand, they note
that in case of entangled10 particles the elements of reality of one system depend
on the measurements performed on the other. Since they perceive the elements
of reality as something objective, independent of any measurement process, they
conclude that the quantum-mechanical description must be incomplete. This idea
was further developed by John Bell [Bel64] who realised that the assumptions of
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen boil down to the existence of local hidden variables,
which completely determine the outcome of all possible measurements. Bell showed
that any theory satisfying these requirements (like the classical theory) is subject to
certain restrictions (now known as Bell inequalities) and demonstrated that quan-
tum mechanics violates such restrictions. The first explicit Bell inequality proposed
by Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt [CHSH69] is a clear-cut evidence that the set
of quantum correlations is strictly bigger than its classical counterpart. Realising
10The term Verschränkung used “to describe the correlations between two particles that interact
and then separate, as in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment” first appeared in a letter written
by Schrödinger who also proposed the English translation: entanglement.
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that quantum mechanics gives rise to an information theory which is qualitatively
different that the classical version, opened a new, fruitful research direction. Ques-
tions concerning storing or transmitting information using quantum systems have
the appealing feature of being operational and fundamental at the same time. In the
1970s Holevo proved how many classical bits can be reliably stored in a quantum
system [Hol73] and Helstrom showed how to optimally distinguish two quantum
states [Hel76].
In 1980 Boris Tsirelson published a breakthrough paper, which exactly charac-
terises the set of correlations achievable using quantum systems (in a restricted class
of scenarios) [Tsi80]. Another important result concerning quantum correlations
comes from Reinhard Werner, who showed that entanglement, while necessary, is
not a sufficient condition for observing stronger-than-classical correlations [Wer89].
In 1982 Wootters and Żurek proved the celebrated no-cloning theorem, which states
that given a single copy of an unknown quantum state, there does not exist a phys-
ical procedure that produces two (perfect) copies [WŻ82]. While the result itself
is rather simple (including the proof), it has far-reaching consequences and shows
that one should be rather careful when applying the classical intuition to quantum
systems. Around the same time the first ideas to use quantum systems to per-
form computation came about. Richard Feynman proposed the concept of quantum
simulation, i.e. using one quantum system to simulate another [Fey82] while David
Deutsch initiated the study of quantum computation by introducing the concept of
a quantum Turing machine and presenting a simple problem which can be solved
more efficiently using quantum systems [Deu85]. While the problem introduced by
Deutsch is of little practical use, it is important as the first demonstration that
quantum computing is strictly more powerful than its classical counterpart.
In 1994 Peter Shor published a paper that changed the status of quantum compu-
tation from an exercise in linear algebra to a field of potentially enormous practical
impact [Sho94]. Shor proposed an algorithm that can efficiently factor large numbers
and solve the discrete logarithm problem, which, as a consequence, allows to break
all commonly used public cryptography systems. In 1996 Lov Grover published an
algorithm that gives a quadratic speed-up while searching an unstructured database
[Gro96].11 These two results sparked enormous interest as they showed that quan-
tum computation might be important from the practical point of view. Since then
the task of finding new quantum algorithms and building an actual quantum com-
puter has been a full-time job of hundreds of computer scientists, physicists and
engineers.
11Note that the speed-up of Grover’s algorithm is provable, i.e. it is quadratically faster than
any classical algorithm. Shor’s algorithm, on the other hand, is exponentially faster than the best
known classical algorithm.
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It seems fair to say that it is the breakthroughs in quantum computation that
gave the whole field a significant push and encouraged many brilliant researchers
to work on quantum information. Since then the field has developed rapidly and
this includes aspects closely related to quantum computation like quantum error-
correction or quantum computer architecture but also areas which are not directly
relevant like quantum correlations, quantum foundations, quantum Shannon the-
ory or quantum cryptography. For more information we refer to a brief survey on
early quantum information written by Bennett and Shor in 1998 [BS98] or to a
book by Nielsen and Chuang [NC00], which became the primary textbook in the
field (in particular for quantum computation). For a detailed introduction to the
information-theoretic aspects (the quantum Shannon theory) see Chapter 1 of Mark
M. Wilde’s book [Wil13].
1.3 Quantum cryptography
In the late 1960s Stephen Wiesner wrote a paper on how to use quantum particles
of spin-1
2
to produce money that is “physically impossible to counterfeit”. The paper
got rejected from a journal and ended up in Wiesner’s drawer (the paper was even-
tually published in ACM SIGACT News [Wie83] about fifteen years later). These
ideas were further pursued by Bennett, Brassard, Breidbart and Wiesner [BBBW83]
and led to a groundbreaking paper proposing the first quantum key distribution pro-
tocol, which allows two distant parties to communicate securely through an insecure
quantum channel [BB84]. In 1991 Artur Ekert proposed a quantum key distribution
protocol that relied on entanglement and Bell’s theorem [Eke91]. Another protocol
(which relies on entanglement but not Bell’s theorem) was presented in Ref. [BBM92]
and soon the first experimental demonstration of quantum key distribution was re-
ported together with concrete solutions for the classical post-processing phase and
explicit security estimates [BBB+92]. Since then an enormous amount of progress
has been made in both theoretical and practical aspects of quantum key distribution
and it is well beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss it. A recent article
by Ekert and Renner is an excellent account of the current state of quantum key
distribution [ER14].
Before we go into the details let us state very clearly that throughout this thesis
we work under the (implicit) assumption that Alice and Bob trust their own devices.
In other words, if the protocol requires Alice to generate a certain quantum state,
she is capable of constructing a device that does just that and she may rest assured
that the source does not accumulate information about the previous uses or leak
secret data through extra degrees of freedom. While this assumption seems natural
and easy to ensure in the classical world, it becomes more of a challenge in the
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quantum world simply because our understanding and expertise in quantum tech-
nologies are limited. These considerations gave rise to the field of device-independent
cryptography which aims to design protocols which remain secure even if executed
using faulty or malicious devices. The fact that such strong security guarantees are
even possible is clearly remarkable and this topic has received a lot of interest in the
last couple of years. Due to a large volume of works on this topic we do not attempt
to list the relevant references and point the interested reader at comprehensible and
accessible lectures notes by Valerio Scarani [Sca12] as well as Sections IV.C and
IV.D of a recent review on Bell nonlocality [BCP+14].
While quantum key distribution was and still remains the predominant area of re-
search in quantum cryptography, other applications have been present from the very
beginning as exemplified by Wiesner’s unforgeable quantum money. The original pa-
per of Bennett and Brassard contains a bit-commitment-based coin tossing protocol
[BB84]. As pointed out by the authors the protocol is insecure if one of the parties
leaves the quantum states untouched (instead of performing the prescribed measure-
ments) but they consider it a “merely theoretical threat” due to the technological
difficulty of implementing such a strategy. In 1991 Brassard and Crépeau proposed
a different quantum bit commitment protocol [BC91], which does not suffer from the
previous problem but is vulnerable against an adversary who can perform coherent
measurements, i.e. joint measurements on multiple quantum particles, which, again,
is considered difficult. By combining the two quantum bit commitment protocols
they obtain a coin tossing protocol which can only be broken by an adversary who
can both keep entanglement and perform coherent measurements. In the meantime
a quantum protocol for oblivious transfer was proposed whose security, again, re-
lies on the adversary being technologically limited [BBCS92]. In 1993 Brassard,
Crépeau, Jozsa and Langlois [BCJL93] proposed a new bit commitment protocol
which comes with a complete security proof that does not rely on any technolog-
ical assumptions. In other words, the protocol is claimed to be secure against all
attacks compatible with quantum physics. In 1992 Bennett et al. suggested how bit
commitment and quantum communication can be used to construct oblivious trans-
fer [BBCS92]. This construction was formalised and proven secure by Yao [Yao95],
who refers to it as the “canonical construction”, which gave the optimistic impres-
sion that quantum mechanics allows for secure two-party cryptography without any
extra assumptions.12 Unfortunately, it was later discovered that the protocol pro-
posed in Ref. [BCJL93] is insecure, which soon led to a complete impossibility result
[May97, LC97]. For a detailed account of quantum cryptography until that point
please consult Refs. [BC96, Cré96, BCMS97].
12This construction shows that in the quantum world bit commitment and oblivious transfer are
equivalent, which is believed not to be true classically.
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The initial results of Mayers, Lo and Chau began a sequence of negative results.
Impossibility of bit commitment immediately rules out oblivious transfer and, in fact,
the same techniques can be used to rule out any one-sided two-party computation
(i.e. a primitive in which inputs from two parties produce output which is only
given to one of them) [Lo97]. The more complicated case of two-sided computation
was first considered by Colbeck (for a restricted class of functions) [Col07] while
the general impossibility result was proven by Buhrman, Christandl and Schaffner
[BCS12]. In case of string commitment (i.e. when we simultaneously commit to
multiple bits) it is clear that the perfect primitive cannot be implemented but the
situation becomes slightly more involved when it comes to imperfect primitives as
the results depend on the exact security criteria used [BCH+06, BCH+08]. For
more recent impossibility proofs of bit commitment see Refs. [DKSW07, WTHR11,
CDP+13].
While perfect quantum bit commitment is not possible, it is interesting to know
what security trade-offs are permitted by quantum mechanics. In the classical case
the trade-offs are trivial: in any classical protocol at least one of the parties can cheat
with certainty. Preliminary results on the quantum security trade-offs were proven
by Spekkens and Rudolph [SR01], while the optimal trade-off curve was found by
Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK11]. Interestingly enough, the achievability is argued
through a construction that uses a complicated and rather poorly understood weak
coin flipping protocol by Mochon [Moc07].
Another direction (similar to what was done previously in the classical world)
is to identify the minimal assumptions that would make two-party cryptography
possible in the quantum world.
One solution available in the classical world is to give Alice and Bob access to
some trusted randomness. The quantum generalisation of this assumption would be
to give Alice and Bob access to quantum systems or some other source of stronger-
than-classical correlations [BCU+06, WWW11]. Such correlations indeed allow us
to implement secure bit commitment. The advantage of this assumption over the
classical counterpart is that in the classical case we had to trust whoever distributed
the randomness (in the original paper referred to as the trusted initialiser [Riv99]).
On the other hand, stronger-than-classical correlations guarantee security regardless
of where they came from.
A natural quantum extension of the bounded storage model proposed by Maurer
[Mau91] is the quantum bounded storage model [DFSS05, DFR+07, Sch10] and its
generalisation to the case of noisy quantum storage [WST08, KWW12, BFW14].
While storing classical information seems easy and cheap (which makes the assump-
tion of the adversary’s bounded storage not particularly convincing), reliable storage
of quantum information continues to pose a significant challenge and, hence, makes
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for a reasonable assumption. Another technological limitation that leads to secure
bit commitment is the restriction on the class of quantum measurements that the
dishonest party can perform [Sal98].
The proposal to combine quantum mechanics with relativistic13 communication
constraints (attributed to Louis Salvail) was already mentioned in 1996 [BC96,
Cré96]. The early papers of Kent [Ken99, Ken05] consider security against quan-
tum adversaries but the actual protocols are completely classical. To the best of
our knowledge, the first quantum relativistic protocol was proposed by Colbeck and
Kent for a certain variant of coin tossing [CK06]. This marks the beginning of
quantum relativistic cryptography.
1.4 Outline
The main theme of this thesis is relativistic quantum cryptography with a particular
focus on commitment schemes. Chapter 2 contains the necessary background in
quantum information theory and cryptography.
In Chapter 3 we introduce non-communicating models as they originally ap-
peared in the context of interactive proofs. We show why they are useful in cryp-
tography and determine the exact communication constraints that might allow for
secure commitment schemes. For each of these models we present a provably secure
bit commitment protocol.
Chapter 4 introduces the framework for relativistic protocols. We start with a
couple of simple examples and then present a procedure which maps a relativistic
protocol onto a model with partial communication constraints. We show that at
least in some scenarios the analysis of such models is tractable.
In Chapter 5 we focus on a particular quantum bit commitment protocol. We
analyse its security by mapping it onto a simple quantum guessing game. Moreover,
we adapt the original protocol to make it robust against experimental errors and we
extend the security analysis appropriately. We briefly report on an implementation
of the protocol done in collaboration with an experimental group at the University
of Geneva.
In Chapter 6 we propose a new, classical multiround bit commitment protocol
and analyse its security against classical adversaries. The multiround protocol allows
to achieve arbitrarily long commitments (at the cost of growing resources) with
explicit and easily-computable security guarantees. Again, we briefly discuss an
experiment performed in collaboration with the Geneva group.
Chapter 7 summarises the content of this thesis and outlines a couple of inter-
esting direction for future research in quantum relativistic cryptography.
13Throughout this thesis the term relativity always refers to special relativity.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we establish the notation, nomenclature and some basic concepts
used throughout this thesis.
2.1 Notation and miscellaneous lemmas
2.1.1 Strings of bits
Given two bits a, b ∈ {0, 1} we use “⊕” to denote their exclusive-OR (XOR)
a⊕ b := a+ b mod 2.
For an n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n, let xk be the kth bit of x and the XOR of two strings
(of equal length) is defined bitwise. The fractional Hamming weight of x is the
fraction of ones in the string
wH(x) =
1
n
∣∣{k ∈ [n] : xk = 1}∣∣,
where | · | denotes the cardinality of the set. The fractional Hamming distance
between x and y is the fraction of positions at which the two strings differ
dH(x, y) =
1
n
∣∣{k ∈ [n] : xk 6= yk}∣∣.
Note that the Hamming weight can be interpreted as the distance from the string
of all zeroes 0n: wH(x) = dH(x, 0n). For S ⊆ [n], we use xS to denote the substring
of x specified by the indices in S. If d ∈ {0, 1} is a bit, we define
d · x =
0n if d = 0,x if d = 1.
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2.1.2 Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for probabilities
When dealing with probabilities we use uppercase letters to denote random variables
and lowercase letters to denote values they might take, e.g. Pr[X = x]. For j, k ∈ S
we use
∑
j 6=k as a shorthand notation for
∑
j∈S
∑
k∈S\{j}.
Lemma 2.1. Let X be a uniform random variable over [n], i.e. Pr[X = x] = 1
n
for
all x ∈ [n], and let {Ej}mj=1 be a family of events defined on [n]. Let p be the average
probability (of these events)
p :=
1
m
m∑
j=1
Pr[Ej]
and c be the cumulative size of the pairwise intersections
c :=
∑
j 6=k
Pr[Ej ∧ Ek].
Then the following inequality holds
p ≤ 1 +
√
1 + 4c
2m
.
Proof. Each event can be represented by a vector in Rn whose entries are labelled
by integers from [n]. If a particular outcome belongs to the event, we set the
corresponding component to 1/
√
n and if it does not we set it to 0
[sj]x =
 1√n if x ∈ Ej,0 otherwise.
Moreover, let n be the normalised, uniform vector: [n]x = 1/
√
n for all x ∈ [n]. It
is straightforward to check that with these definitions we have
Pr[Ej] = 〈sj, n〉 = 〈sj, sj〉 and Pr[Ej ∧ Ek] = 〈sj, sk〉,
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the standard inner product on Rn and since the vectors are
non-negative we have 〈sj, sk〉 ≥ 0. Since the inner product is linear we have
p =
1
m
m∑
j=1
Pr[Ej] =
1
m
∑
j
〈sj, n〉 = 1
m
〈
∑
j
sj, n〉,
which can be upper bounded using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since 〈n, n〉 = 1
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we have
〈
∑
j
sj, n〉2 ≤
∑
jk
〈sj, sk〉 =
∑
j
〈sj, sj〉+
∑
j 6=k
〈sj, sk〉 = mp+ c,
which gives the following quadratic constraint
p2 ≤ p
m
+
c
m2
.
Solving for p gives the desired bound.
2.1.3 Chernoff bound for the binomial distribution
Lemma 2.2 ([Che52]). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random variables taking
on values 0 or 1. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ be the expectation value of X. Then for
any δ > 0 the following inequality holds
Pr[X < (1− δ)µ] <
(
e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
)µ
≤ exp
(
− µδ
2
2
)
.
Alternatively, setting s = (1− δ)µ gives
Pr[X < s] < exp
(
− 1
2
(√
µ− s√
µ
)2)
.
2.2 Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics despite its mysterious nature admits a relatively simple mathe-
matical description. While it is an interesting question to ask why quantum mechan-
ics is as it is, instead of being more (or less) powerful (and indeed such questions con-
stitute the main topic of quantum foundations), we take a more hands-on approach.
Namely, we accept the standard textbook formulation of quantum mechanics as it
is and investigate its consequences. Section 2.2.1 defines the basic notions of linear
algebra (and, hence, can be skipped by most readers), which will be necessary to
describe the quantum formalism in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Linear algebra
The following section contains the bare minimum of linear algebra necessary to
understand this thesis and serves primarily the purpose of establishing consistent
notation and nomenclature. For a complete and detailed introduction to linear
algebra we refer to the excellent textbooks by Rajendra Bhatia [Bha97, Bha09].
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In this thesis we restrict our attention to finite-dimensional systems. Let H be
a Hilbert space of finite dimension d = dimH <∞ over complex numbers. Let H∗
denote the dual space of H, i.e. the space of linear functionals on H. We employ
the bra-ket notation proposed by Paul Dirac [Dir39], in which elements of H are
written as kets |ψ〉 ∈ H and each ket has an associated bra, denoted by 〈ψ | ∈ H∗,
such that applying the linear functional 〈ψ | to an arbitrary vector |φ〉, written as a
bra-ket 〈ψ |φ〉, corresponds exactly to evaluating the inner product between |φ〉 and
|ψ〉. A set of d vectors {|ej〉}dj=1 constitutes an orthonormal basis if the vectors are
orthogonal and normalised, i.e. 〈ej |ek〉 = δjk, where δjk is the Kronecker delta.
Let L(H) be the set of linear operators acting on H. The identity operator,
denoted by 1, is the unique operator that satisfies
1|ψ〉 = |ψ〉
for all |ψ〉 ∈ H. Writing a linear operator L ∈ L(H) in a particular basis {|ej〉}dj=1
leads to a d× d (complex) matrix whose entries equal
Ljk = 〈ej |L|ek〉,
where the expression 〈ej |L|ek〉 should be understood as 〈ej |
(
L|ek〉
)
. Note that while
the operator and its matrix representation are not the same object (the former is
basis-independent, while the latter corresponds to a particular basis) for the pur-
pose of this thesis this distinction may be ignored and we will use the two terms
interchangeably. The trace of a square matrix L is the sum of its diagonal entries
trL =
∑
j
Ljj =
∑
j
〈ej |L|ej〉.
The Hermitian conjugate of an operator L, denoted by L†, is defined to satisfy
[L†]jk = [Lkj]∗,
where ∗ denotes the complex conjugate. An operator satisfying L† = L is called
Hermitian (or self-adjoint) and we denote the set of Hermitian operators acting on
H by H(H). Operators satisfying LL† = L†L = 1 are called unitary operators or
unitaries.
It is easy to verify that for a Hermitian operator H = H† we have 〈ψ |H|ψ〉 ∈ R
for all vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H. A Hermitian operator is called positive semidefinite if
〈ψ |H|ψ〉 ≥ 0
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for all vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H, which is often written as H ≥ 0.
Every linear operator L ∈ L(H) admits a singular value decomposition, i.e. it
can be written in the form L = USV , where U and V are unitary operators and S
is a diagonal matrix of real, non-negative entries known as the singular values of L.
Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sd) be the vector of singular values. For p ∈ [1,∞) the Schatten
p-norm of L, denoted by ||L||p, is defined as the vector p-norm of s
||L||p :=
( d∑
j=1
spj
)1/p
.
For the purpose of this thesis we will only need the limit p→∞ so let us define
||L|| := lim
p→∞
||L||p = max
j
sj.
2.2.2 Quantum formalism
A pure state of a quantum system is described by a normalised vector, i.e. |ψ〉 ∈ H
such that 〈ψ |ψ〉 = 1. We adopt the convention that every d-dimensional Hilbert
space H is equipped with an orthonormal basis {|k〉}d−1k=0, which we call the compu-
tational (or standard) basis. Writing |ψ〉 in this basis
|ψ〉 =
d−1∑
j=0
cj|j〉
allows us to interpret it as a d-dimensional complex unit vector. The global phase of
a state is inconsequential, i.e. quantum mechanics tells us that vectors |ψ〉 and eiα|ψ〉
(for α ∈ R) correspond to the same physical state. The smallest non-trivial quantum
system corresponds to d = 2 and is called a qubit (a term coined by Schumacher
and Wootters [Sch95]). The Hadamard operator is defined as
H =
1√
2
∑
j,k∈{0,1}
(−1)jk|j〉〈k |
or
H =
1√
2
 1 1
1 −1
 .
It is easy to verify that H is simultaneously Hermitian (H = H†) and unitary
(HH† = H†H = H2 = 1). Define |+〉 := H|0〉, |−〉 := H|1〉 and let us call
{|+〉, |−〉} the Hadamard (or diagonal) basis. The computational and Hadamard
bases are widely used in cryptography because they are an example of mutually
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unbiased bases (for d = 2), i.e. they satisfy
|〈0|+〉| = |〈0|−〉| = |〈1|+〉| = |〈1|−〉| = 1√
2
(
=
1√
d
)
,
which captures the notion of being maximally incompatible.
A mixed quantum state on H is a Hermitian operator, which is positive semidef-
inite and of unit trace. We define the set of (mixed) quantum states on H
S(H) := {ρ ∈ H(H) : ρ ≥ 0 and tr ρ = 1}.
The operator ρ describing a mixed state is called the density matrix. Mixed states
are a generalisation of pure states: an arbitrary pure state |ψ〉 can be represented
as a density matrix ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ |. Mixed states arise naturally when dealing with
composite systems.
Suppose we have two systems (or registers) A and B described by Hilbert spaces
HA and HB, respectively, and we want to describe the global state of the system.
What are the allowed states on A and B taken together? In case of pure states,
quantum mechanics tells us to take the tensor product of the two Hilbert spaces,
i.e. |ψ〉AB ∈ HA ⊗HB. Therefore, an arbitrary pure bipartite state can be written
as
|ψ〉AB =
∑
jk
cjk|j〉A|k〉B,
where |j〉A|k〉B should be understood as |j〉A ⊗ |k〉B (the tensor product symbol is
commonly omitted to avoid notational clutter). Given a bipartite system one might
wonder what can be said about the marginal states on A and B (similar to the
concept of the marginals of a probability distribution). In particular, one would
expect that if we restrict ourselves to measurements on A alone then it should be
possible to “truncate” |ψ〉AB to A by disregarding any information about B. This
intuition leads the concept of reduced states. Let us first write the density matrix
corresponding to |ψ〉AB
ρAB = |ψ〉〈ψ |AB =
∑
jj′kk′
cjkc
∗
j′k′|j〉〈j′ |A ⊗ |k〉〈k′ |B.
Given an operator acting on multiple registers we define the operation of partial
trace which “traces out” a particular register, e.g.
trB
(|j〉〈j′ |A ⊗ |k〉〈k′ |B) = |j〉〈j′ |A · trB (|k〉〈k′ |B) = |j〉〈j′ |A · δkk′ .
Note that the standard trace operation corresponds to tracing all the registers. It
is easy to verify that partial traces commute so we can without ambiguity write
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trAB(·) = trA trB(·) = trB trA(·). Tracing out the B register from the density matrix
ρAB gives
ρA = trB ρAB =
∑
jj′k
cjkc
∗
j′k|j〉〈j′ |A,
which is easily verified to be a valid quantum state ρA ∈ S(HA) and which we
call the reduced state on A. It is easy to verify that the knowledge of ρA suffices to
make all possible predictions about operations or measurements that act solely upon
subsystem A. In cryptography reduced states are important because they allow us
to quantify the amount of knowledge that a particular subsystem provides to its
holder.
Once we know how to describe the state of a quantum system we would like to
know how we can interact with it. To extract any information from a quantum state
one needs tomeasure it. Note that this is one of the aspects in which quantum theory
differs significantly from its classical counterpart. In the classical world the object
and its (complete) description are operationally equivalent : given the description one
can construct the object and given the object one can determine (to an arbitrary
precision) its description. In the quantum world a single copy of an object gives us
significantly less information than its complete description as demonstrated by the
no-cloning theorem [WŻ82]. In contrast to the classical world, every quantum system
can be measured in multiple ways, which means that the measurement process must
be described explicitly. A measurement1 on a d-dimensional quantum state which
yields outcomes from a finite alphabet X is a collection of positive semidefinite
operators {Fx}x∈X 2 that add up to (d-dimensional) identity
Fx ≥ 0 and
∑
x∈X
Fx = 1. (2.1)
Quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory, i.e. it only allows us to calculate proba-
bilities of observing different outcomes. According to Born’s rule [Bor26] measuring
the state ρ ∈ S(H) yields outcome x with probability
p(x) = tr(Fxρ).
It is easy to see that the condition (2.1) is imposed to ensure that the resulting prob-
ability distribution is non-negative and normalised for every state. Note that such
an information-theoretic formulation of the measurement process does not necessar-
ily coincide with the notion of measuring a physical quantity, e.g. the outcome might
1We implicitly assume that we are only interested in the classical outcome of the measurement
and ignore the post-measurement state.
2To avoid confusion whenever describing the set of measurement operators we explicitly state
the index that must be summed over to obtain identity.
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not be a number so one cannot talk about the expectation value or the standard
deviation of the measurement.
The process of measuring a quantum state can be seen as a map that takes a
quantum state and outputs a probability distribution. This naturally generalises to
maps in which the output remains quantum and such maps are known as quantum
channels. The identity channel (i.e. the unique channel that leaves every state
unaffected) is denoted by id3. Generally, a map Φ : L(HA)→ L(HB) is a quantum
channel iff:
1. Φ is linear, i.e. for any α, β ∈ C and X, Y ∈ L(HA)
Φ(αX + βY ) = αΦ(X) + βΦ(Y ).
2. Φ is completely positive, i.e. for any XAR ∈ H(HA ⊗ HR), where HR is an
auxiliary Hilbert space of arbitrary dimension,
X ≥ 0 =⇒ (ΦA ⊗ idR)(XAR) ≥ 0.
3. Φ is trace-preserving, i.e. for any X ∈ L(HA)
tr Φ(X) = trX.
These properties can be rigorously derived from the assumption that a channel is a
result of a unitary evolution acting on a larger Hilbert space. On a more pragmatic
level, these rules ensure that the channel is a linear map that takes quantum states
on A into valid quantum states on B. When dealing with multipartite states it
might be useful to explicitly write out the input and output registers, e.g. ΦA→B.
2.2.3 Remote state preparation
A state of the form
ρXB =
∑
x
px|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxB (2.2)
is called classical-quantum (cq) since the first register represents a classical random
variable X while the second is a general quantum system. Such states describe how
a quantum system can be correlated with some classical data. One way of obtaining
such a state is to sample the classical random variable X and prepare subsystem
B in a particular state conditional on the outcome. Here, we show how to use
3Note that it is common in quantum information to use the same symbol for the identity channel
and the identity operator since it is usually clear from the context which one is meant. To avoid
confusion we prefer to use different symbols.
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entanglement to remotely prepare a certain class of such states, a phenomenon also
known as steering.
Define the maximally entangled state of dimension d as
|Ψd〉AB := 1√
d
d∑
j=1
|j〉A|j〉B.
It is easy to verify that in this case both marginals are maximally mixed, i.e. pro-
portional to the identity matrix
trA |Ψd〉〈Ψd |AB = trB |Ψd〉〈Ψd |AB = 1
d
.
Moreover, for an arbitrary linear operator L =
∑
jk Ljk|j〉〈k |, we have
trA
[
(L⊗ 1)|Ψd〉〈Ψd |
]
= LT,
where LT denotes the transpose with respect to the computational basis
LT =
∑
jk
Ljk|k〉〈j |.4
If we replace L with a measurement operator this implies that observing a particular
outcome on A results in a particular subnormalised quantum state on B. Hence, we
have remotely prepared a state on B by performing a measurement on A. It is easy
to see that any cq-state of the form (2.2) which satisfies
∑
x
pxρ
x =
1
d
, (2.3)
can be obtained by performing the right measurement on one half of the d-dimensional
maximally entangled state. More specifically, the appropriate measurement {Fx}x
is described by measurement operators Fx = dpx(ρx)T. The restriction (2.3) ex-
presses the rule that the reduced state on B must remain unchanged, i.e. it must
remain maximally mixed. This phenomenon turns out to be important in quantum
cryptography.
An essential feature of quantum information is the ability to encode information
in two (or more) incompatible bases. The most common example was originally
introduced by Wiesner [Wie83] but goes under the name of BB84 states (after
Bennett and Brassard who popularised the term [BB84]). In this case Alice uses
either computational or Hadamard basis to encode a logical bit x ∈ {0, 1} in a qubit
4The transpose operation is basis-dependent just like the definition of the maximally entangled
state.
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which she later sends to Bob. If the logical bit is uniform the two encodings lead to
ρXB =
1
2
∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |x〉〈x|B.
and
ρXB =
1
2
∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗H|x〉〈x|BH,
respectively. It is easy to verify that both of these satisfy relation (2.3) with d = 2.
This leads to an important observation (in this particular cryptographic context due
to Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [BBM92]) that such states can be prepared by first
generating the maximally entangled state of two qubits |Ψ2〉 and then measuring
subsystem A in the right basis. In fact, Alice simply makes a measurement in either
computational or Hadamard basis.
Since measurements on Alice’s side commute with any operations on Bob’s side,
they can be delayed until some later point in the protocol, which means that now
Alice and Bob share entanglement during the protocol. In other words, we have
turned a prepare-and-measure scheme (Alice prepares a state and sends it to Bob,
who performs a measurement), in which there is no entanglement between Alice
and Bob, into an equivalent (from the security point of view) entanglement-based
scheme (Alice and Bob simultaneously perform measurements on a shared entangled
state). Often the entanglement-based schemes are easier to analyse, which we we
will take advantage of to prove security of a quantum relativistic bit commitment
protocol in Chapter 5.
2.3 Multiplayer games
For the purpose of this thesis, a game is an interaction between a referee and one or
more players. The referee asks each player a question and the player must give an
answer. In most cases the players are not allowed to communicate during the game.
A strategy is a procedure that the players follow to generate their answers. At the
end of the game, the referee decides whether the game is won or lost.
2.3.1 Classical and quantum strategies
For concreteness, we consider a game of m non-communicating players. Each player
receives an input from X and is required to output a symbol from Y (X and Y are
arbitrary finite alphabets). A game is defined by the input distribution
p : X × X × . . .×X︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
7→ [0, 1]
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and a predicate function
V : (X × Y)× . . .× (X × Y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
7→ {0, 1}
which specifies whether the players win or lose for a particular combination of inputs
and outputs.5
Every strategy available to classical players can be written as a convex combina-
tion of deterministic strategies. Hence, the maximum winning probability, denoted
by ω and referred to as the classical value of the game, can be achieved by a de-
terministic strategy. A deterministic strategy is a collection of m functions (fj)mj=1,
fj : X 7→ Y , which determine each player’s response. Therefore,
ω := max
f1,f2,...,fm
∑
x1∈X
. . .
∑
xm∈X
p(x1, . . . , xm)V
(
x1, f1(x1), . . . , xm, fm(xm)
)
,
where the maximum is taken over all combinations of functions.
Quantum players, in turn, are allowed to share a quantum state and perform
measurements that depend on the inputs. For simplicity in the quantum setting we
only describe two-player games (m = 2) but these concepts extend in a straight-
forward way to an arbitrary number of players (see for example Ref. [Vid13]). A
quantum strategy consists of a bipartite pure quantum state (of finite dimension)
|ψ〉AB6 and measurements that each player will perform for every possible input
x ∈ X , denoted by {F xy }y∈Y , {Gxy}y∈Y . The maximum winning probability achiev-
able by quantum players denoted by ω∗ is called the quantum value
ω∗ := sup
∑
y1,y2∈Y
∑
x1,x2∈X
p(x1, x2)V
(
x1, y2, x2, y2
)〈ψ |F x1y1 ⊗Gx2y2 |ψ〉,
where the optimisation is taken over all quantum strategies.
Calculating the classical value of a game can be done by iterating over all possible
strategies. While this is clearly not efficient (the number of strategies to check is
exponential in the number of inputs), at least in principle it can be done.7 On
the other hand, computing the quantum value is a more difficult problem and no
generic procedure is known.8 The problem stems from the fact that we do not
5Clearly, this generalises in a straightforward manner to the case where the range of V is R.
Then V assigns a particular score to every combination of inputs and outputs. However, in this
thesis we only consider games in which the players either win or lose.
6It is sufficient to consider pure states since a mixed state can be written as a convex combination
of pure states.
7In fact, finding the classical value of a general game is NP-hard, i.e. we believe it cannot be
done efficiently.
8The quantum value of an XOR game can be calculated using semidefinite programming tech-
niques [Weh06]. For general games there exist hierarchies by Navascués, Pironio, Acín [NPA07]
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have a convenient description of the quantum set of correlations (i.e. there is no
efficient procedure to decide whether a given point belongs to the set or not). To
establish an upper bound on the quantum value of a game it is common to consider
a larger set of correlations known as the no-signalling correlations, which does admit
a simple description. Intuitively, this is the largest set of correlations that does not
allow to send messages between different parties and the simplest example is the
so-called Popescu-Rohrlich box [PR94]. Because the no-signalling set is a polytope
(i.e. the convex hull of a finite set of extreme points) we know how to optimise over
it (at least in principle, efficiency considerations apply as before). For a detailed
characterisation of different sets of correlations refer to a recent review paper on
Bell nonlocality [BCP+14].
2.3.2 Finite fields
A field is a set with two operations: addition and multiplication, which satisfy the
usual properties as listed below.
• The field is closed under multiplication and addition.
• Both operations are associative.
• Both operations are commutative.
• There exist additive and multiplicative identity elements.
• There exist additive and multiplicative inverses (except for the additive iden-
tity which does not have a multiplicative inverse).
• Multiplication is distributive over addition.
It is easy to see that real or complex numbers form with the standard addition and
multiplication are fields. We call a field finite (the name Galois field is also used
after Évariste Galois) if the set of elements is finite. The order of a finite field is
the number of elements in the set and a finite field of order q exists iff q is a prime
power, i.e. q = pk for some prime p and integer k. Since all finite fields of a given
order are isomorphic (i.e. they are identical up to relabelling of the elements), we
speak of the finite field of order q denoted by Fq. For a thorough introduction to
finite fields please consult an excellent book by Mullen and Mummert [MM07].
Finite fields appear often in coding theory and cryptography since they are finite
sets closed under (appropriately defined) addition, multiplication and their inverses.
and Doherty, Liang, Toner, Wehner [DLTW08], which give increasingly tighter approximations on
the correct value. While these hierarchies ultimately converge to the correct value, the rate of con-
vergence is not well-understood. Moreover, calculating the higher level approximations becomes a
difficult task from the computational point of view.
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P1 P2 Pm
X2, X3, . . . , Xm X1, X3, . . . , Xm X1, X2, . . . , Xm−1
Y1 Y2 Ym
Fig. 2.1: The “Number on the Forehead” model. Vertical lines remind us that the
players are not allowed to communicate.
Moreover, all these operations can be implemented efficiently on a computer. Fields
corresponding to p = 2 are a common choice since their elements have a natural
representation as strings of bits. The protocol proposed in Chapter 6 uses finite-field
arithmetic and its security hinges on the difficulty of a certain family of multiplayer
games. In this section we prove upper bounds on the classical value of such games
and discuss the connection to a natural algebraic problem concerning multivariate
polynomials over finite fields.
2.3.3 Definition of the game
Buhrman and Massar [BM05] proposed a generalisation of the CHSH game [CHSH69],
which was further studied by Bavarian and Shor [BS15]. A natural multiplayer gen-
eralisation of this game arises in the security analysis of the multiround bit com-
mitment protocol in Chapter 6. Since the analysis does not require familiarity with
the actual actual bit commitment protocol and might be of independent interest, we
have decided to make it a stand-alone component of the Preliminaries (rather than
incorporating it in Chapter 6).
Consider a game withm players, denoted by P1,P2, . . . ,Pm, and letX1, X2, . . . , Xm
be random variables drawn independently, uniformly at random from Fq
p(x1, x2, . . . , xm) = (q
−1)m = q−m.
We use [n] to denote the set of integers between 1 and n, [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. In
the “Number on the Forehead” model [CFL83] Pk receives all the random variables
except for the kth one, which we denote by X[m]\{k}, and is required to output an
element of Fq, which we denote by Yk (see Fig. 2.1). The game is won if the sum of
the outputs equals the product of the inputs (all the operations are performed in the
finite field), i.e. the predicate function is
V (x1, y2, . . . , xm, ym) =
1 if
∏m
k=1 xk =
∑m
k=1 yk,
0 otherwise.
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If the player Pk employs a deterministic strategy described by fk : F(m−1)q 7→ Fq,
i.e. he outputs Yk = fk(X[m]\{k}), then the winning probability equals
ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm) := Pr
[ m∏
k=1
Xk =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})
]
.
As described in Section 2.3 the classical value of the game equals
ωm := max
f1,f2,...,fm
ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm), (2.4)
where the maximisation is taken over all combinations of functions from F(m−1)q to
Fq.9 Our goal is to find an upper bound on ωm as a function of q and m.
2.3.4 Relation to multivariate polynomials over finite fields
As the probability distribution of inputs is uniform the winning probability of a par-
ticular deterministic strategy (defined by a collection of functions f1, f2, . . . , fm) is
proportional to the number of inputs (x1, x2, . . . , xm) on which the following equality
holds
m∏
k=1
xk =
m∑
k=1
fk(x[m]\{k}). (2.5)
Alternatively, we can count the zeroes of the following function
P (x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
m∏
k=1
xk −
m∑
k=1
fk(x[m]\{k}).
By the Lagrange interpolation method every function from Fnq to Fq (for arbitrary
n ∈ N) can be written as a polynomial. Therefore, the question concerns the
number of zeroes of the polynomial P . Different strategies employed by the players
give rise to different polynomials and we need to characterise what polynomials are
“reachable” in this scenario. The output of Pk is an arbitrary polynomial of x[m]\{k},
hence, it only contains terms that depend on at most m− 1 variables. This means
that the part of P that depends on all m variables comes solely from the first term
and equals
∏m
k=1 xk. Therefore, finding the classical value of the game is equivalent
to finding the polynomial with the largest number of zeroes, whose only term that
depends on all m variables equals
∏m
k=1 xk. This shows that the optimal strategy for
our game is closely related to purely algebraic properties of polynomials over finite
fields.
9Clearly, this is a function of both q and m but we have decided not to mention the dependence
on q explicitly (to avoid overcrowding the symbol with sub- or superscripts). This is justified
because in our application q is a parameter that has to be chosen before the protocol begins,
whereas m can be decided upon at some later point.
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2.3.5 A recursive upper bound on the classical value
Here, we find explicit upper bounds on ωm through an induction argument. First,
note that for m = 1 there is only one term on the right-hand side of Eq. (2.5) and
since this term takes no arguments it is actually a constant. Since X1 is uniform we
have
ω1 := max
c∈Fq
Pr[X1 = c] =
1
q
.
Now, we derive an upper bound on ωm in terms of ωm−1. For a fixed strategy
(f1, f2, . . . , fm) the winning probability can be written as
ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm) = Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})
]
=
∑
y∈Fq
Pr[Xm = y] · Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})
∣∣Xm = y]
= q−1
∑
y
Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})
∣∣Xm = y].
Conditioning on a particular value of Xm leads to events that only depend on
X1, X2, . . . , Xm−1. In particular, setting Xm = y defines the event Fy
Fy ⇐⇒ X1X2 . . . Xm−1y =
m−1∑
k=1
fk(X[m−1]\{k}, y) + fm(X[m−1]),
which satisfies
Pr[Fy] = Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})|Xm = y
]
. (2.6)
We can use Lemma 2.1 to find a bound on ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm) = q−1
∑
y Pr[Fy] as
long as we are given bounds on Pr[Fy ∧ Fz] for y 6= z.
Proposition 2.1. For y 6= z we have Pr[Fy ∧ Fz] ≤ ωm−1.
Proof. Eq. (2.6) defines Fy through a certain equation in the finite field. If the
equations corresponding to Fy and Fz are satisfied simultaneously then any linear
combination of these equations is also satisfied. More specifically, we define a new
event
Gyz ⇐⇒ X1X2 . . . Xm−1(y − z) =
m−1∑
k=1
fk(X[m−1]\{k}, y)− fk(X[m−1]\{k}, z) (2.7)
and since Fy∧Fz =⇒ Gyz we are guaranteed that Pr[Fy∧Fz] ≤ Pr[Gyz]. To find an
upper bound on Pr[Gyz] we give the players more power by allowing a more general
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expression on the right-hand side. In Eq. (2.7) the kth term is a particular function
of X[m−1]\{k}, y and z, so let us replace it by an arbitrary function of these variables
fk(X[m−1]\{k}, y)− fk(X[m−1]\{k}, z) → gk(X[m−1]\{k}, y, z).
Under this relaxation, we arrive at the following equality
X1X2 . . . Xm−1(y − z) =
m−1∑
k=1
gk(X[m−1]\{k}, y, z).
Clearly, (y − z) is a constant, non-zero multiplicative factor known to each player.
Dividing the equation through by (y−z) leads to the same game as considered before
but one player has been eliminated (there are only m− 1 players now). Therefore,
Pr[Fy ∧ Fz] ≤ Pr[Gyz] ≤ ωm−1.
This allows us to prove the main technical result.
Proposition 2.2. The classical value of the game defined in Section 2.3.3 satisfies
the following recursive relation
ωm ≤ 1 +
√
1 + 4q(q − 1)ωm−1
2q
. (2.8)
Proof. The statement follows directly from combining Lemma 2.1 with Proposi-
tion 2.1.
Since we know that ω1 = q−1, we can obtain a bound on ωm by recursive evaluation
of Eq. (2.8). More precisely, we get ωm ≤ cm for
cm =
q−1 for m = 1,1+√1+4q(q−1)cm−1
2q
for m ≥ 2.
Note that this bound is always non trivial, i.e. cm < 1 for all values of q and m. To
obtain a slightly weaker but simpler form presented in Eq. (6.9) in Chapter 6 we
note that 1− 4qcm−1 ≤ 0 and set q = 2n.
2.4 Cryptographic protocols and implementations
Cryptography is a field is driven by applications, i.e. the starting point is a particular
task that two (or more) parties want to perform. Formulating a task in a rigorous,
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mathematical language gives rise to a cryptographic primitive. In case of two-party
cryptography two aspects must be specified.
• Correctness: The expected behaviour when executed by honest parties.
• Security: A list of behaviours that are forbidden regardless of the strategies
that the dishonest parties might employ.
Defining correctness is straightforward because what we want to achieve is clear
from the beginning. Finding the right definition of security, on the other hand,
might be a challenging task. Converting our intuition about what the primitive
should not allow for into a mathematical statement is not always straightforward and
often multiple security definitions are simultaneously in use depending on the exact
context. Sometimes security is perfect (cf. the hiding property of bit commitment in
Definition 2.2), but more often it is quantified by a (small) number usually denoted
by ε (cf. the binding property in Definition 2.3), which can be (usually) understood
as an upper bound on the probability that a cheating attempt is successful.
It is worth emphasising that no meaningful statements can be made if all involved
parties decide to cheat simply because if they collectively deviate in the “right” way
they can produce any imaginable output. If all the dishonest parties form a coalition
whose only goal is to enforce a certain output, nothing can stop them from achieving
it. In particular, in the two-party case Alice and Bob could, instead of executing
the protocol, decide to play a game of chess and then the output of the interaction
would be a complete account of a chess game. Clearly, no cryptographic statements
can be made about a chess game. Therefore, we only consider scenarios in which
at least one party is honest and that is why in the two-party setting we prefer to
talk about security for honest Alice (Bob) instead of security against dishonest Bob
(Alice).
Once the primitive has been defined we propose a protocol (i.e. a sequence of
interactions between the players) that implements it. Verifying the correctness of
a cryptographic protocol is simple since the honest parties behave in a well-defined
manner. Showing security, on the other hand, is more complicated because we need
to characterise all possible ways in which the dishonest parties might deviate from
the protocol and argue that none of them violates the security requirements of the
primitive. In a protocol that does not achieve perfect security, the final outcome
of a security proof is an upper bound on how well the dishonest party can cheat.
Since the level of security that we are happy to accept depends on the precise cir-
cumstances, protocols usually come in families parametrised by an integer n ∈ N
and the security guarantee is a function of n ideally satisfying ε(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
Increasing the value of n leads to protocols that use more resources (e.g. computa-
tion, communication or randomness) but achieve better security. Ideally, we would
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like ε(n) to decay exponentially but inverse polynomial decay might also be accept-
able. Security analysis of such a family of protocols aims to find the tightest bound,
i.e. lowest ε(n), as a function of n.
Having performed the theoretical analysis of a protocol, the last step is to ac-
tually implement it. In case of mature technologies (e.g. modern digital devices)
fault-tolerance (capability of terminating correctly even in the presence of errors) is
ensured at the hardware level so there is no need to introduce any extra measures in
the actual protocol. The multiround classical relativistic bit commitment protocol
discussed in Chapter 6 is a prime example: the simplest theoretical protocol is al-
ready suitable for implementation and no modifications are necessary. On the other
hand, in case of less developed fields like quantum technologies the situation is a
bit more complicated. Since we have not yet found a way to (generically) eliminate
all the errors, we must consider how they will affect our protocol. What happens
when honest parties follow the protocol but their communication or storage suffers
from noise? Depending on how severe the errors are, the protocol either terminates
with the wrong output or it aborts. To prevent such an undesirable outcome the
protocol must be modified to become fault-tolerant. The exact modifications that
need to be made depend on what type of noise we want to protect ourselves against.
More specifically, we need to have a model of noise that is simple enough to anal-
yse but remains a reasonably faithful description of the experimental setup. As
a consequence, turning a theoretical protocol into an experimental proposal is not
so straightforward and usually requires multiple rounds of communication between
the theoretician and the experimentalist. The new fault-tolerant protocol admits
a couple of parameters, which determine its error tolerance, and these should be
chosen to ensure that the protocol terminates successfully (with high probability)
when performed by the honest parties. In this case asymptotic analysis is sufficient,
since it is the actual experiment that demonstrates correctness (while calculations
simply give us an indication whether the experiment is worth setting up).
Having modified our protocol we need to reassess its security and it is clear that
introducing fault-tolerant features makes a protocol more vulnerable to cheating.
Moreover, since the security analysis is supposed to please the most paranoid cryp-
tographers, we must make minimal assumptions about the adversary. In particular,
we do not want to impose on him any technological restrictions. Our devices are
imperfect due to our lack of skills and knowledge but we do not want to assume that
about the adversary. The standard approach to quantum cryptography is to assume
that the devices used by the honest party are trusted (i.e. their precise description
including potential imperfections is known) but the devices used by the adversary
might be arbitrary (i.e. they are only limited by the laws of physics).10
10As mentioned before the trust assumption can in fact be dropped. See Section 1.3 for references.
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Clearly, requiring that our protocol is correct for honest parties with imperfect
devices and remains secure against an all-powerful adversary puts us in a difficult
situation. As mentioned before, the fault-tolerant protocol takes a couple of param-
eters which we can try adjusting but we might nevertheless reach the conclusion that
guaranteeing correctness and security simultaneously is not possible. This means
that the quality of the devices available to the honest parties is not sufficient to
allow for a secure execution of the protocol.
We can turn this statement around and ask about the minimal requirements on
the honest devices. How much noise can we tolerate before the protocol becomes
insecure? Note that now this is a property of the protocol alone and we should aim
to design protocols with the highest possible noise tolerance. In case of quantum
technologies a successful implementation of a cryptographic protocol often requires
a collective effort of the experimentalist (who attempts to reduce the experimental
noise to the absolute minimum) and the theoretician (who improves the theoretical
security analysis). An example of such an analysis for a quantum bit commitment
protocol is presented in Chapter 5.
2.5 Bit commitment
Recall Example 2 from Section 1.1, in which Alice wants to commit to a certain
message without actually revealing it. Commitment schemes have multiple appli-
cations, for example they allow us to prove that we know something or that we
are able to predict some future event without revealing any information in advance.
They are also a useful tool to force different parties to act simultaneously, even if
the communication model is inherently sequential. Consider two bidders who want
to take part in an auction but there is no trusted auctioneer at hand. In the usual,
sequential communication model one of them has to announce his bid first, which
gives an unfair advantage to the other bidder. This can be rectified if the first
bidder commits to his bid (instead of announcing it) and opens it only after the
second bidder has announced his price. Hence, given access to a commitment func-
tionality, one can perform a fair auction without a trusted third party. Moreover,
commitment schemes are often used in reductions to construct other cryptographic
primitives. For the purpose of this section we restrict ourselves to schemes in which
the committed message is just one bit.
As explained in Section 2.4 the protocol should be correct (it should succeed if
executed by honest parties) and secure (the honest party should be protected even
if the other party deviates arbitrarily from the protocol).11 To make precise math-
11One can also design cheat-sensitive protocols [ATVY00, HK04], in which one party constantly
monitors the other party’s action and might abort the protocol in the middle if they believe that
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ematical statements, we need a formal description of the protocol in the quantum
language.
2.5.1 Formal definition
The primitive of bit commitment is usually split into two phases: the commit phase
and the open phase. In the commit phase Alice interacts with Bob and at the end
of the commit phase she should be committed, i.e. she should no longer have the
freedom to choose (or change) her commitment. Nevertheless, Bob should remain
ignorant about Alice’s commitment. In the open phase Alice sends to Bob the bit
she has committed to, along with a proof of her commitment, which he examines to
decide whether to accept the opening or not.
While this description is sufficient for most purposes, it has some undesirable
features. First of all, since it does not explicitly mention the period in between
the two phases, it might create the impression that there is no interval in between,
i.e. it might lead to the false conclusion that the end of the commit phase and the
beginning of the open phase correspond to the same point of time. This is clearly
misleading as the whole point of a commitment scheme is to obtain a finite interval
between the two, i.e. a period in which Alice is committed to a message which Bob
remains ignorant about. The distinction is usually not made explicit because in most
protocols nothing happens in between the two phases (Alice and Bob just savour
the moment of being securely committed), which means that the two points are
operationally equivalent (e.g. any information that Bob might extract about Alice’s
commitment just before the open phase he might also extract immediately after the
commit phase). This is not true for protocols in which communication continues
in between the two phases and there the distinction is important. Therefore, we
explicitly introduce the sustain phase, i.e. the period during which the commitment
is valid. For reasons which will become clear soon, we call the beginning of the
sustain phase the commitment point and the end the opening point. We also split
up what is usually called the open phase into two separate parts: in the open phase
Alice unveils d to Bob and sends him a proof of her commitment (which we assume
to be a single message12), while in the verify phase Bob decides whether to accept
the other party is cheating, but we do not consider them here. Similarly, cheat-sensitive coin
flipping protocols have been proposed [SR02].
12The assumption that the open phase consists of a single message from Alice to Bob might
seem restrictive but it does not rule out any interesting protocols. Any interaction between Alice
and Bob in the open phase can be simulated locally by Bob given that Alice provides him with all
the relevant information. Since there is no need to protect Alice’s privacy any more, the security
of the protocol is not affected. In fact, we could consider an extreme case in which Alice does not
even extract a proof and instead passes all the (possibly quantum) information in her possession to
Bob. Again, this would not affect security but might unnecessarily increase the size of the message.
Note that while this simulation argument does not change the situation of honest Alice, it might
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commitment point
opening point
1. commit 2. sustain 3. open 4. verify
Fig. 2.2: The phase structure of a generic bit commitment protocol.
the opening or not. The phase structure is shown in Fig. 2.2.
We use A and B to denote the subsystems of Alice and Bob, respectively. We use
P to denote the proof, which is generated (in the open phase) by Alice and sent to
Bob. We implicitly assume that P contains the information about the value d that
Alice is trying to unveil. Since the commit and sustain phases are interactive they
do not admit a compact description in the quantum formalism. The open phase can
be described as a quantum channel ΦopenA→P , which acts on Alice’s subsystem (A) to
produce a proof (P ). Bob’s decision whether to accept or reject the commitment in
the verify phase can be described by a binary measurementM = {Maccept,Mreject}
performed jointly on subsystems B and P .
The honest scenario is relatively straightforward to analyse. The protocol spec-
ifies uniquely (for each value of Alice’s commitment d) the state shared between
Alice and Bob at every stage of the protocol and finding it explicitly is a matter of
simple calculation.
Definition 2.1. Let ρdAB be the state shared between Alice and Bob at the opening
point, ΦopenA→P be the opening map andM = {Maccept,Mreject} be the final measure-
ment. A bit commitment protocol is (1− δ)-correct if for d ∈ {0, 1} we have
tr(Macceptρ
d
BP ) ≥ 1− δ,
where ρdBP = Φ
open
A→P (ρ
d
AB).
In the dishonest scenario the situation becomes a bit more complicated because
the state shared between Alice and Bob is no longer uniquely specified. For example,
if Alice is dishonest then the state of her subsystem might be completely arbitrary.
For the purpose of defining security it is convenient to talk about the set of states
that dishonest Alice (or Bob) can enforce during the protocol and we will use σAB
to denote such states (to distinguish them from the honest states denoted by ρAB).13
These sets are then used to quantify security.
As discussed before, coming up with the right security definition is not trivial
because it requires us to turn the intuitive notion of security into a mathematical
change (to worse) the situation of dishonest Alice but this shall not concern us.
13Note that for a generic, multiround protocol characterising such sets might be a difficult task.
Nevertheless, these sets are always well-defined and allow us to define security in a convenient way.
35
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
statement. It is useful to realise that the dishonest scenario is operationally equiv-
alent to a game between the honest party (acting as a referee since their behaviour
is determined by the protocol) and the dishonest party (a player who is allowed to
adopt an arbitrary strategy). Thus, defining security is equivalent to specifying the
exact rules of such a “cheating game”.
To look at a concrete example let us start with the case of honest Alice and
dishonest Bob. Bob’s goal is to find out the value of Alice’s commitment before the
open phase begins, i.e. at the opening point, and to achieve this he might deviate
arbitrarily from the protocol. This admits a natural formulation as a game in which
Alice (the referee) chooses d ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and follows the honest
protocol until the opening point. Then, Bob is challenged to guess d at the opening
point and the probability of guessing d correctly is a natural measure of his cheating
abilities. To phrase this in terms of quantum states, let σdAB be the state at the
opening point and note that a particular strategy of dishonest Bob enforces two
distinct states (σ0AB, σ1AB).
Definition 2.2. A bit commitment protocol is hiding if all pairs of states (σ0AB, σ1AB)
that Bob can enforce at the opening point satisfy
σ0B = σ
1
B, (2.9)
where σdB = trA σdAB.
This definition implies that whatever strategy Bob employs, he obtains no informa-
tion about Alice’s commitment.14 Note that this property is sometimes referred to
as being perfectly hiding, in contrast to schemes that only guarantee Alice partial
security. Since all protocols considered in this thesis are perfectly hiding, we always
use hiding to mean perfect security.
The case of dishonest Alice and honest Bob is a bit more complex. In order to
claim that Alice’s commitment begins at the commitment point, we must show that
at that point she no longer has the freedom to unveil both values, regardless of the
strategy adopted prior to that. In other words, the dishonest behaviour of Alice
can be seen as two distinct strategies (corresponding to d = 0 and d = 1) which
are identical until the commitment point and let us call such strategies compatible.
Intuitively, this means that she can delay the choice which strategy to follow until
the commitment point.
14Note that this implies that the equality (2.9) holds not just at at the opening point but at all
times until that point. If at any point the two reduced states were not equal Bob could simply
store his system until the opening time (possibly sending Alice some freshly prepared states if
necessary).
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Definition 2.3. Let (σ0AB, σ1AB) be a pair of states that Alice can enforce at the
opening point using compatible strategies and let (Φcheat,0A→P ,Φ
cheat,1
A→P ) be opening maps.
Define pd to be the probability that Alice’s attempt to unveil d is accepted by Bob
pd = tr
(
Maccept
[
Φcheat,dA→P (σ
d
AB)
])
.
A bit commitment protocol is called ε-binding if for all states (σ0AB, σ1AB) and for
all opening maps (Φcheat,0A→P ,Φ
cheat,1
A→P ) we have
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε.
Note that finding the optimal opening map for a particular intermediate state σdAB
is a semidefinite program so it can be solved efficiently. Therefore, the cheating
strategy is essentially specified by a pair of compatible strategies.
It is clear that the restriction that the two strategies are compatible is cru-
cial. Clearly, Alice can enforce the honest pair of states (ρ0AB, ρ1AB), which leads to
p0 = p1 = 1 (as long as the protocol is correct), but this cannot be achieved using
compatible strategies (if it was possible, the protocol would be completely insecure).
Note that this formulation is equivalent to a game in which Alice employs some
generic strategy until the commitment point and is immediately after challenged to
open either d = 0 or d = 1 chosen uniformly at random.15 A strategy that wins
such a game with probability pwin is equivalent to a cheating strategy which achieves
p0 + p1 = 2pwin. Thinking of the cheating scenario as a game often allows a more
intuitive understanding of what the dishonest party is trying to achieve.
Note that it might seem natural to demand that there is only one value that Alice
might successfully open. However, this requirement is too strong because we cannot
prevent Alice from committing to a random bit which leads to p0 = p1 = 12 . This
idea can be developed further to produce a reachable notion of security [DFSS05,
WST08], which has the advantage of being composable, i.e. security is guaranteed
even if the primitive is used as a subroutine in a longer procedure [Can01]. However,
it is known that this stronger notion of security cannot be reached in the relativistic
setting (see Appendix A for details). Therefore, in this thesis we only consider the
weaker, non-composable Definition 2.3.
2.5.2 The Mayers-Lo-Chau impossibility result
As explained in Section 1.3, in the early 1990s a significant effort went into inves-
tigating whether various two-party tasks can be solved using quantum protocols.
15Note that this challenge must come from an external source like the referee. It is not convincing
for Alice to unveil a bit chosen by herself.
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Unfortunately, most of such tasks were ultimately shown to be impossible even in
the quantum world. In this section we sketch out the impossibility proof for quan-
tum bit commitment discovered independently by Mayers [May97] and Lo and Chau
[LC97].
Before going into the details of the quantum no-go argument let us sketch out
the classical one. Consider a protocol which is correct and hiding and suppose
Alice follows the honest strategy for d = 0 until the commitment point. Since
the protocol is correct Alice can proceed with the honest strategy and successfully
unveil d = 0. What if she wants to cheat and unveil d = 1 instead? The protocol
is hiding, which means that Bob does not know the value of her commitment. This
implies that there exists a particular strategy for Alice after the commitment point
that will make him accept d = 1 (otherwise he could eliminate this possibility).
The existence of such a strategy implies that Alice can unveil either value (with
certainty), i.e. achieve p0 + p1 = 2. This argument can be extended to show that in
every classical protocol (which is correct) at least one of the parties can cheat with
certainty. Such arguments are formalised using the notion of a transcript, which
is simply the complete list of messages exchanged by Alice and Bob. It is clear
that in the classical world each party can produce a transcript by copying all the
messages to a private, auxiliary register. In the quantum world one cannot simply
copy messages so it is not meaningful to talk about the transcript of a quantum
protocol. That is why this simple classical argument does not apply to quantum
protocols.
The quantum impossibility argument hinges on the fact that, without loss of
generality, we can assume that Alice and Bob keep the entire quantum state pure
until the commitment point. Since Alice and Bob share no correlations (these would
count as a resource) and private randomness can be purified locally, we can assume
that Alice and Bob start in a pure, product state. Then, all the measurements
can be performed coherently (also known as keeping the measurements quantum, see
Section 1.3 of Ref. [Col06] for an explanation). This requires us to replace all the
classical channels in the protocol by quantum channels. Since this might open up
new, inherently quantum cheating strategies we must instruct each party to measure
(coherently) each incoming message. This gives rise to a new (but equivalent from
the security point of view) protocol, in which all the interactions happen at the
quantum level and at the commitment point Alice and Bob share a pure state,
which we denote by |ψd〉AB.16 According to Definition 2.2 the protocol is hiding if
ρ0B = ρ
1
B. Unfortunately, due to Uhlmann’s theorem [Uhl76] this implies that there
16This is one way of dealing with classical communication known as the indirect approach. For
more details on the indirect approach and also the alternative direct approach see Ref. [BCMS97].
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exists a unitary UA acting on subsystem A alone such that
(UA ⊗ 1B)|ψ0〉AB = |ψ1〉AB.
In other words, Alice can switch between the two honest states by acting on her
system alone, which allows her to unveil either bit (with certainty) and, therefore,
renders the protocol completely insecure. Formally the impossibility can be stated
in the following manner.
Theorem 2.1. Any protocol which is perfectly correct and hiding allows Alice to
cheat perfectly. In other words, there exists a cheating strategy for Alice which
achieves p0 = p1 = 1.
This simple argument applies only to the exact case where ρ0B = ρ1B but it is easy
to show that if ρ0B is close to ρ1B (i.e. Bob finds it difficult to distinguish them) then
Alice can cheat with high probability and trade-offs based on this idea were derived
by Spekkens and Rudolph [SR01]. Optimal bounds on quantum bit commitment
have been found by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK11].
While quantum mechanics does not allow for perfect bit commitment, it still
beats classical protocols. As mentioned before every classical protocol is completely
insecure against one of the parties. Quantum protocols, on the other hand, allow us
to achieve some intermediate points, in which security is in some sense “distributed”
between Alice and Bob.
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Chapter 3
Non-communicating models
This chapter (excluding Section 3.1) is based on
• Secure bit commitment from relativistic constraints [arXiv:1206.1740]
J. Kaniewski, M. Tomamichel, E. Hänggi and S. Wehner
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 59, 7 (2013).
(presented at QCrypt ’12)
It is well-known that interrogating suspects is more fruitful if they cannot commu-
nicate during the process, simply because coming up with two reasonable stories is
more difficult than with one.1 This intuition was first made rigorous in the context
of complexity theory but similar features can be seen in cryptography, in which non-
communicating models allow us to implement primitives which would be otherwise
forbidden. Care has to be taken, however, since the primitive implemented in the
non-communicating model is usually subtly different (weaker) than the original one
and, hence, might not be suitable for all applications.
Non-communicating models can be formalised using the concept of agents. For
example, if in the standard protocol Alice interacts with Bob, in the multiagent
variant she might be required to interact with two distinct agents of Bob. In this
case we think of Bob as being the main party, who decides on the strategy and briefs
all his agents beforehand but steps back as soon as the protocol begins. During the
protocol the agents follow the instructions but are not allowed to communicate with
each other (or the main party). In this chapter we adopt the convention that if
Alice (Bob) only needs to delegate one agent we do not make an explicit distinction
between the main party and the agent. If more agents are involved we make a
distinction by calling the agents Alice1 and Alice2 (Bob1 and Bob2).
While it is entirely possible to discuss multiagent commitment schemes with-
out any reference to complexity theory, we feel it is beneficial to explain where
1This only holds if the interrogation is an interactive and unpredictable process. If the suspects
can predict all the possible questions in advance, nothing prohibits them from producing consistent
answers.
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the idea of employing multiple agents originally came from. We explain how such
models arose in the context of interactive proofs [Bab85, GMR85, BGKW88] and
we discuss connections between zero-knowledge proofs and cryptography [GMW86,
BGKW88, Gol08]. We also consider a multiagent variant of oblivious transfer and
present a (trivial) protocol that implements it. This serves as a useful example to
demonstrate that the functionality implemented in the multiagent scenario might
differ significantly from the original primitive.
When it comes to analysing multiagent commitment schemes one of the major
conceptual challenges is to establish a framework which encompasses all interest-
ing schemes without being overly complicated. While for a particular scheme it is
fairly straightforward to come up with an ad hoc treatment and security definition
(which is often left implicit), a general framework is necessary for comparing var-
ious schemes. We propose such a framework based largely on results published in
Ref. [KTHW13].
Outline: We start by explaining the concept of an interactive proof system and why
employing multiple agents makes the model significantly more powerful. Then we
discuss how such models can be used in the context of cryptography using distributed
oblivious transfer [NP00] as an example. The last section of the chapter is dedicated
to multiagent commitment schemes. We explain what kind of arrangements of agents
are useful for the purpose of commitment schemes and propose how to quantify
security in these new, multiagent models.
3.1 Interactive proof systems
The purpose of this section is to give a brief, non-technical introduction to the
field of interactive proof systems. We are particularly interested in multiprover
models2, zero-knowledge proofs and their relation to cryptography. The notes of
Oded Goldreich [Gol08] provide a thorough and accessible introduction to interactive
proof systems. Readers interested in the early history of interactive proofs are
referred to a wonderfully entertaining essay by László Babai [Bab90].
Let us start with a motivating story. Suppose that Bob wants to be convinced
that a certain statement is true. His own computational powers are limited (so he
cannot simply verify the statement on his own) but he has access to an all-powerful
computer called Alice. Unfortunately, Alice is a malicious machine and she will
always assert that the statement is true (even if it is actually false). To make things
worse she will even provide an incorrect proof, hoping that Bob will fall for it. Bob
wants to interact with Alice in such a way that if she is honest and the proof is correct
2In the context of complexity theory, it is always the prover (one of the involved parties) who
is required to delegate multiple agents.
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he accepts it, but if she misbehaves and outputs an incorrect proof her misconduct
should be noticed. On a more fundamental level, we are asking whether it is possible
to verify computations that are, by assumption, beyond our own capabilities.
Since we always assume that Alice knows the statement that Bob wants to be con-
vinced of, she might simply produce a proof and send it to Bob. This coincides with
the way we usually think of proofs as static, non-interactive objects, e.g. something
that can be published in a book. This is a valid solution but we know from everyday
experience that the process of learning and understanding is often facilitated by the
possibility of asking questions and receiving answers. The same phenomenon occurs
in case of proofs and gives rise to the concept of an interactive proof, which cannot
be published in a book but can be explained in class. It turns out that allowing
Alice and Bob to interact might significantly simplify certain proofs. Moreover, as
counter-intuitive as it sounds it allows Alice to prove a statement without revealing
anything about the actual proof. In complexity theory the setting described above
is known as an interactive proof system, with Alice being the prover and Bob the
verifier, and was introduced independently by Babai [Bab85] and Goldwasser, Micali
and Rackoff [GMR85].
To demonstrate the advantage of interactive proofs we need some concrete state-
ments, which we will then construct (interactive) proofs for. It turns out that graph
theory is a good source of intuitive and interesting examples. Given two graphs
G0 and G1 we say that they are isomorphic if we can map G0 onto G1 by simply
relabelling the vertices. The problem of deciding whether two graphs are isomorphic
is known as the graph isomorphism problem and we do not know how to solve it
efficiently.3
This is exactly the setting we want to look at: Bob has two graphs G0 and G1
and he wants to know whether they are isomorphic. Since he is unable to solve
this problem on his own, he asks Alice for help. If the graphs are isomorphic Alice
simply sends Bob a valid relabelling (of vertices) and he verifies that it indeed maps
G0 onto G1. This is an efficient, non-interactive proof. The problem becomes a bit
more complex if the graphs are not isomorphic. Alice could, of course, write down
all possible relabellings and show that none of them achieves the goal but this does
not really save Bob any computational effort. Verifying such a brute-force “proof” is
not any easier than producing it. As of today, we do not know how to (generically)
construct a non-interactive, efficient proof that two graphs are not isomorphic.
On the other hand, a beautifully simple solution exists if Alice and Bob are
3In fact, it is one of the few interesting problems that seem to sit in the middle between the
“easy problems” (i.e. the ones that can be solved efficiently) and the really hard ones (i.e. the ones
that we do not think can be solved efficiently, like the travelling salesman problem). Interested
readers are encouraged to read a survey by Scott Aaronson on the distinction between the easy
and the hard problems and how they relate to physical reality [Aar05].
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allowed to interact [GMW86]. Bob picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, applies a random
relabelling to Gb and sends it to Alice, whose task is to guess b. If the graphs are
not isomorphic then Alice can always correctly identify the original graph (she is
all-powerful so she can simply try all possible relabellings) and successfully answer
Bob’s challenge. On the other hand, if the graphs are isomorphic then by applying
a random relabelling Bob made the message that Alice receives independent of
b.4 Hence, her probability of guessing b correctly is exactly 1
2
. If we repeat this
game multiple times the probability of correctly answering all the challenges decays
exponentially. If Alice can reliably tell the two graphs apart, then Bob should be
convinced that the two graphs are not isomorphic (except for exponentially small
probability).
The connection between interactive proofs and cryptography appears when we
impose an additional requirement that the proof should carry no information beyond
the validity of the statement. This concept introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and
Wigderson goes under the name of a zero-knowledge proof [GMW86]. Note that
this formulation sounds suspiciously similar to our initial motivation for commit-
ment schemes in Section 1.1, in which Alice wants to prove to Bob that she knows
something without revealing any additional information.
Let us go back to the problem of proving that two graphs are isomorphic. The
obvious solution presented before is to provide a valid relabelling explicitly. Unfor-
tunately, this reveals much more information than necessary: we want to prove the
existence of a relabelling rather to exhibit a particular one. Can we prove that two
graphs are isomorphic in a zero-knowledge manner? Clearly, this cannot be done
using a static proof but adding interactions helps as demonstrated below.5
Again, we assume that Alice knows both graphs G0 and G1. She applies a
random relabelling to G0 and sends it to Bob as H. Bob chooses a random bit b and
challenges Alice to reveal the relabelling that maps H onto Gb. Clearly, if G0 and G1
are isomorphic Alice can always produce a valid answer. However, if they are not,
she can find a valid answer to at most one of the two challenges (regardless of how
she chose H). Again, by repeating this test a number of times Bob can be convinced
that the two graphs are indeed isomorphic. Why is this proof zero-knowledge? This
is clear if Bob acts honestly (i.e. he chooses the bit b at random), because then at the
end of the protocol we can see H as a random relabelling of Gb. This is something
that Bob could have generated himself, hence, he has obtained no extra knowledge.
The situation becomes more complex if we consider malicious Bob who might choose
b based on the graph H he receives. A rigorous proof that this protocol remains
4More precisely, the probability distributions over graphs sent to Alice are identical for b = 0
and b = 1.
5Requiring a static proof to be zero-knowledge reduces it to a trivial assertion “this statement
is true”, which the verifier will not find too convincing.
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zero-knowledge in this adversarial scenario is significantly more involved [GMW86].
Once we know how to prove that two graphs are isomorphic in a zero-knowledge
manner it is natural to ask what other statements can be proven in such a way. If
we are happy to accept an extra computational assumption then it turns out that
any statement that can be proven using a static proof can also be proven in a zero-
knowledge fashion [GMW86]. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson realised
that the computational assumption can be dropped by introducing an extra prover
(who is not allowed to communicate with the first one during the protocol) and,
in fact, their solution is quite simple [BGKW88]. Before the protocol begins the
provers generate a long, random string. During the protocol all the work is done by
Prover1, while Prover2 simply outputs segments of the shared randomness (randomly
chosen by the verifier). Essentially, the goal is to convince the verifier that Prover1
is using genuine, pre-existing randomness rather than generating (faking?) it on
the spot. As a crucial step in the proof they propose a bit commitment scheme in
the two-prover model and prove its security. They also present a construction for a
particular flavour of distributed oblivious transfer.
The observation that computational security in Ref. [GMW86] is used to provide
commitment-like functionality is made explicit in Construction 2.4 from Goldreich’s
lecture notes [Gol08], in which a generic zero-knowledge proof is constructed under
the assumption that commitment functionality is available for free. This shows that
the primitive of bit commitment establishes a connection between zero-knowledge
proofs and multiprover models.
Multiprover models were introduced to remove computational assumptions in
the context of zero-knowledge proofs but have since become an independent object
of study in complexity theory. In fact, they have been shown to be significantly
more powerful than the single-prover class [FRS94, BFL91]. The quantum versions
of these complexity classes have been proposed by allowing the provers to share
entanglement either with [KM02] or without [CHTW04] quantum communication
(with the verifier). The two classes have recently been shown to be equal [RUV13].
3.2 Applications in cryptography
We have seen that introducing multiple provers is useful in the context of interactive
proofs and now we would like to see what can be gained in cryptography. Here, we
consider a simple example and our main goal is to convince the reader that such
models are not subject to the usual impossibility arguments and explain why that
is the case.
Let us go back to the primitive of oblivious transfer explained by the example
of an online movie service in Section 1.1. Alice has paid for one movie and wants
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to download it without revealing her choice to the company (Bob). In spirit of the
previous section we consider a multiagent model in which Bob is required to delegate
two agents, who interact with Alice but cannot communicate with each other. In the
original primitive Bob should never find out which movie Alice chose to download.
However, in the multiprover setting an interesting question arises: what happens
to the agents after the protocol ends? Since it is hard to envision keeping them
isolated until the end of time, we may first lean towards a model in which they
are allowed to communicate after the protocol is finished. However, as pointed out
in Appendix A.2 of Ref. [BGKW88] in that case secure oblivious transfer is not
possible. Temporary communication constraints are not sufficient as the standard
no-go argument applies whenever the agents meet: if their combined knowledge does
not allow them to deduce which message was retrieved, both messages must have
leaked out to Alice.6
This encourages us to investigate the other extreme case in which the provers are
not allowed to ever communicate again.7 Such a primitive is known as distributed
oblivious transfer [NP00] (or symmetrically-private information retrieval if we focus
on the limit of a large number of messages [GIKM00, Mal00, Gas04, KdW04]) and
it admits the following simple solution based on secret sharing8. For simplicity let
us consider the case of Bob having only two messages m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}n.
Protocol 1: Distributed oblivious transfer
1. (prepare) Bob generates an n-bit string r ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random
and sends (u0, u1) = (m0⊕r,m1⊕r) to Bob1 and (v0, v1) = (r,m0⊕m1⊕r)
to Bob2.
2. (execute) Alice chooses a random bit c ∈ {0, 1} and requests uc from Bob1.
6It is possible to retain some security if we assume that the amount of communication between
the provers is bounded [BGKW88].
7Note, however, a certain conceptual weakness of this model. The only manner in which Alice
can ensure that the two agents never communicate again is to keep at least one of them isolated
forever. But in that case it should not matter if that particular agent finds out which movie she
wants to watch, hence, no cryptography is necessary. Note that keeping an agent isolated forever
sounds morally wrong if we think of him as a human being but becomes more socially acceptable
if we replace him by a disposable electronic device. Unfortunately, while in case of a human agent
the assumption that he will only allow Alice to retrieve one movie is natural (an agent is capable of
protecting the integrity of his laboratory), in case of an inanimate device this becomes essentially a
technological assumption. Such devices have been proposed under the name of one-time memories
[GKR08].
8We only use the simplest type of secret sharing in which an unknown string x is split up into
two shares: s1 = x ⊕ r and s2 = r, where r is a string chosen uniformly at random. The two
shares together allow us to reconstruct the string but it is easy to verify that having just one share
conveys no information about x.
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To retrieve md she requests vd⊕c from Bob2 and computes the message as
md = uc ⊕ vd⊕c.
This protocol is secure because both Bob1 and Bob2 see Alice asking for a random
message so neither of them obtains any knowledge about her choice. Moreover, it
is easy to verify that no information is leaked about the message that Alice did
not choose. Hence, this constitutes a secure multiagent implementation of oblivious
transfer. However, as discussed in Section 4.1 we do not know how to usefully
implement this protocol in a relativistic setting.
Why does such a protocol evade the standard no-go result9? It is important to
realise that the no-go implicitly assumes that the whole world is split between Alice
and Bob and there are no third parties: Alice can only be sure about the systems
in her possession and everything else is fully controlled by Bob (this is equivalent
to the assumption that the state shared between Alice and Bob is pure). In the
multiagent model this must be modified as the state is now shared between Alice,
Bob1 and Bob2. Since Bob1 and Bob2 cannot communicate (their knowledge cannot
be combined), the usual impossibility argument does not apply.
3.3 Commitment schemes
The original zero-knowledge interactive proof proposed by Ben-Or et al. relies on
a multiagent bit commitment scheme [BGKW88]. The proposed scheme is correct,
hiding and ε-binding for ε = 1
2
. On the other hand, in Section 2.5.2 we have argued
that in the standard two-party model such schemes cannot exist.
Again, we must realise that the standard notion of a commitment scheme implic-
itly assumes that the protocol is executed by two parties only (no additional agents)
and the impossibility result only holds for that case. Multiagent schemes require
new security definitions and in general the usual limitations (proven in the standard
two-party model) will not apply. While it is usually clear how security definitions
should be extended to multiagent protocols, it is important to do it explicitly, as it
helps to understand the exact nature of the primitives under consideration.
Requiring a party to delegate agents who are not allowed to communicate (which
we also refer to as splitting) restricts the range of actions available to that party.
Clearly, this might only be useful for security purposes if communication constraints
9The intuition behind the standard no-go argument in the classical case is as follows. If at
the end of the protocol Bob cannot tell which message Alice has decided to retrieve it must mean
that through the interaction he has leaked both of them. In a world split only between Alice and
Bob whatever Bob leaks becomes immediately available to Alice, which implies that she must have
learnt both messages.
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commitment point
opening point
1. commit 2. sustain 3. open 4. verify
α : Bob is split
β : Alice is split
Fig. 3.1: The two types of minimal splits that are potentially useful for the purpose
of commitment schemes.
apply during the relevant party’s “turn to cheat”. According to the phase structure
discussed in Section 2.5, this leads to either splitting Bob until the opening point
(which we call α-split) or splitting Alice from the commitment point (β-split).10 The
two different splits are shown in Fig. 3.1. Since we are interested in the fundamental
possibilities and limitations, we will discuss protocols for both splits (and we will
find that the resulting bit commitment primitives exhibit subtle differences).
Before proposing particular protocols, let us first adapt the security definitions
to such multiagent scenarios. Since security requirements state what the dishonest
party should not be able to achieve, it is clear that we need a new definition of the
hiding property in the α-split and a new definition of the binding property in the
β-split.
A commitment scheme is hiding if at the opening point Bob remains ignorant
about Alice’s commitment. In the α-split model at the opening point there are two
agents Bob1 and Bob2, who are not allowed to communicate. Similarly to the case
of distributed oblivious transfer if we require that even their combined knowledge
does not allow them to learn the commitment, then the standard no-go applies
(i.e. Alice can cheat with certainty). However, we can instead require that neither
Bob1 nor Bob2 can guess the commitment, which leads to a natural condition closely
resembling Definition 2.2.
Definition 3.1. A multiagent bit commitment protocol is hiding if all pairs of
states (σ0AB1B2 , σ
1
AB1B2
) that Bob1 and Bob2 can enforce at the opening point satisfy
σ0B1 = σ
1
B1
and σ0B2 = σ
1
B2
,
where σdBc = trAB1−c σ
d
AB1B2
.
This definition means that neither of the agents has learnt anything about Alice’s
10Note that these are the minimal splits, i.e. they are necessary to evade the impossibility result.
Later we will consider models which impose more than the minimal splits.
48
3.3. COMMITMENT SCHEMES
commitment but it says nothing about their combined knowledge. This naturally
leads to the following protocol based on secret sharing. For bit commitment proto-
cols we adopt the convention that a (b) denotes to the private randomness of Alice
(Bob) while x (y) are the messages sent during the protocol by Alice (Bob). Note
that the labels x and y are used regardless of whether the parties are honest or not.
Protocol 2: Bit commitment from secret sharing
1. (commit) Alice generates a random bit a ∈ {0, 1}, sends x1 = d ⊕ a to
Bob1 and x2 = a to Bob2.
2. (open and verify) Bob1 and Bob2 get together and compute the commit-
ment as d = x1 ⊕ x2.
This protocol is so simple that neither party can even attempt to cheat! In
the commit phase whatever combination of messages Alice decides to produce, it
will correspond to an honest commitment, which she has no influence over once the
messages are received by Bob1 and Bob2 (i.e. this is exactly the commitment point
of the protocol). On the other hand, if Alice is honest then both Bob1 and Bob2
receive a uniform bit (regardless of the value of d) so the protocol is hiding according
to Definition 3.1.
A potential drawback of this protocol is that in certain scenarios, we might want
to give Alice the right to refuse opening a commitment. Clearly, in this protocol
this could only be done if Bob1 and Bob2 were never allowed to communicate again,
which is a problematic assumption (cf. footnote 7 in Section 3.2).
It turns out that this feature (of allowing Alice to keep the commitment value
hidden forever) is much easier to achieve in the β-split model. As explained in
Section 2.5.1 security for honest Bob can be quantified through a game in which Alice
performs some generic strategy until the commitment point and is then challenged
(by an external referee) to open either d = 0 or d = 1 with equal probabilities. The
commitment is considered secure if she is not able to win this game with probability
significantly exceeding 1
2
(an honest commitment achieves at least 1
2
as long as the
scheme is correct). In case of Alice1 and Alice2 performing the open phase in a
non-communicating fashion, we need to specify who actually receives the challenge.
Is it both Alice1 and Alice2 or just, say, Alice1? The former scenario might arise if
Alice1 and Alice2 despite not being able to communicate with each other might still
receive messages from an external source (it might be easier to isolate the agents
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from each other than from the external world). For example, what they attempt
to unveil might depend on the latest stock market news. It turns out that this
distinction is important and gives rise to two different models, which we call global
and local command, respectively. This choice does not affect Alice1: in both cases
her cheating behaviour is determined by two compatible strategies11, just like in the
standard single-agent model. However, the allowed behaviour of Alice2 is affected.
In the global command model she chooses two compatible strategies but in the local
command she may only choose one (since she never actually finds out what they are
trying to unveil).
Definition 3.2. Let (σ0AB, σ1AB) be a pair of states that Alice1 and Alice2 can
enforce at the opening point given that Alice1 employs two compatible strategies
and Alice2 employs
• local command: only one strategy (regardless of the value of d).
• global command: two compatible strategies.
Let (Φcheat,0A→P ,Φ
cheat,1
A→P ) be opening maps of the form
• local command: Φcheat,dA→P = Φcheat,dA1→P1 ⊗ ΦcheatA2→P2 .
• global command: Φcheat,dA→P = Φcheat,dA1→P1 ⊗ Φcheat,dA2→P2 .
Define pd to be the probability that Alice’s attempt to unveil d is accepted by Bob
pd = tr
(
Maccept
[
Φcheat,dA→P (σ
d
AB)
])
.
A multiagent bit commitment protocol is called ε-binding in the local/global
commandmodel if for all states (σ0AB, σ1AB) and for all opening maps (Φ
cheat,0
A→P ,Φ
cheat,1
A→P )
allowed by the model we have
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε.
To see that the distinction between the two models is important, note that the local
command model allows for the following trivial bit commitment protocol.
Protocol 3: Bit commitment in the local command model
1. (commit) Alice sends d to Alice1 and Alice2.
11See Section 2.5.1 for an explanation what it means for two strategies to be compatible.
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2. (open) Alice1 sends x1 = d and Alice2 sends x2 = d to Bob.
3. (verify) Bob verifies that x1 = x2.
In the local command model dishonest Alice1 receives the challenge and knows
what they are trying to unveil but Alice2 does not. Since the value they are chal-
lenged to unveil is chosen uniformly at random, she cannot guess it too well. In fact,
the best she can do is to always output the same value, which essentially corresponds
to an honest commitment. Here, security is a direct consequence of the fact that
Alice2 does not know what she is supposed to be unveiling. It is clear that in this
protocol Alice is committed as soon as communication between Alice1 and Alice2
is forbidden. Protocol 3 is secure in the local command model but it is easy to see
that it is completely insecure in the more stringent global command model. Does
there exist a protocol that remains secure in the global command model?
It turns out that no classical protocol in the β-split model can meet this require-
ment and the argument is similar to the standard no-go for bit commitment. Let
us assume that the protocol is correct and hiding, i.e. it allows Alice1 and Alice2 to
make an honest commitment, which until the opening point leaks no information
to Bob and the opening is always accepted. Suppose Alice1 and Alice2 honestly
commit to d = 0. Clearly, unveiling d = 0 in the open phase is easy but since Bob
cannot rule out Alice’s commitment to d = 1, there must also exist a sequence of
messages from Alice1 and Alice2 which will make him accept d = 1. Since now both
of them know what they are trying to unveil, this strategy can be implemented and
the protocol is completely insecure.
The intuitive argument presented above makes a subtle assumption that all infor-
mation that Alice and Bob exchange in the commit phase is available to both Alice1
and Alice2 in the open phase. There are two ways of invalidating this assumption.
1. Make the information that Bob shares with Alice in the commit phase quan-
tum. Then, by the no-cloning theorem [WŻ82] it will not (in general) be
possible for both Alice1 and Alice2 to have an exact copy.
2. Strengthen the communication constraint, i.e. require that only Alice1 takes
part in the commit phase while Alice2 is already isolated.
The first solution was explored under the name of quantum relativistic bit com-
mitment by Kent [Ken11, Ken12b] and a rigorous security analysis of the latter
protocol (including experimental imperfections like noise and losses) can be found
in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Moreover, two new protocols based on different features
of quantum theory were recently proposed [AK15a, AK15b]. The second solution
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corresponds to the original proposal of Ben-Or et al. [BGKW88], further developed
in Refs. [Sim07, CSST11]. Since the protocol is simple and intuitive we present it
here but we defer rigorous security analysis until Chapter 6.
The bit commitment scheme proposed in Ref. [BGKW88] is sufficient from the
complexity point of view but it is not the most convenient formulation for crypto-
graphic purposes. As described in Section 2.4 in cryptography it is convenient to
have a family of protocols with a parameter n ∈ N which can be chosen to guar-
antee the desired level of security. Such a protocol was presented under the name
simplified-BGKW (sBGKW) in Refs. [Sim07, CSST11]. In this case Alice1 and Alice2
are not allowed to communicate throughout the entire protocol. Let a and b be n-bit
strings chosen uniformly at random by Alice and Bob, respectively.
Protocol 4: Simplified-BGKW
1. (commit) Bob sends y1 = b to Alice1 and she replies with x1 = d · y1 ⊕ a.
2. (open) Alice2 reveals x2 = a to Bob.
3. (verify) Bob verifies that x1 ⊕ x2 = d · b.
(The bit-by-string multiplication was defined in Section 2.1.1.) In a protocol
which requires Alice1 and Alice2 to be already isolated in the commit phase, it be-
comes important whether the value of the commitment must be known to both or
just one of them. In this particular case Alice1 can single-handedly decide on the
value of the commitment.12 Correctness of the protocol is easy to verify while the
hiding property is a simple consequence of the fact that the message that Alice1
sends to Bob in the commit phase is “one-time padded” with a uniformly random
string. On the other hand, we intuitively see that the binding property is a direct
consequence of the communication constraint between Alice1 and Alice2 (cheating
would be easy if Alice2 knew b). Moreover, note that in this protocol Alice2 can sim-
ply refuse to take part in the open phase and then the commitment made by Alice1
(if she indeed followed the protocol in the commit phase) will remain secret forever.
In this aspect, this protocol differs significantly from Protocol 2. This difference will
have quite interesting consequences when we consider relativistic variants of these
protocols in Section 4.1.
12It is interesting to note that Alice2 (the only agent of Alice who takes part in the open phase)
does not need to know the value she is unveiling.
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Relativistic protocols
This chapter is based on
• Secure bit commitment from relativistic constraints [arXiv:1206.1740]
J. Kaniewski, M. Tomamichel, E. Hänggi and S. Wehner
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 59, 7 (2013).
(presented at QCrypt ’12)
In Chapter 3 we saw that communication constraints are useful in a variety of situa-
tions. In particular, they enable us to implement cryptographic primitives which are
not possible otherwise. Non-communicating models are widely studied in computer
science but unless one can justify such communication constraints, they should be
treated on equal footing with other technological limitations and we already know
that assumptions concerning computational power or storage capabilities make two-
party cryptography possible.
How could Alice possibly ensure that Bob1 and Bob2 cannot communicate? Well,
in principle she could lock each of them up in separate rooms. First of all, Bob1 and
Bob2 might not be happy with such a solution but even if they are, how does she
ensure that the rooms are perfectly shielded from the outside world? Does this not
lead to yet another technological assumption?
One way out of the vicious circle of technological assumptions is relativity. Im-
posing an upper bound on the speed at which information spreads implies that
communication between any two distinct locations incurs some minimal delay (pro-
portional to the distance between them). This gives rise to temporary communica-
tion constraints, which rely solely on the correctness of the theory of relativity. It
is worth pointing out that this is the only feature of relativity used in relativistic
cryptography.
It is important to stress the difference between non-communicating and relativis-
tic protocols. In a non-communicating protocol (like the ones discussed in Chapter
3) we first explicitly specify communication constraints and then the interactions
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between the agents. On the other hand, in a relativistic protocol one cannot simply
impose such arbitrary communication constraints. Instead, they must arise from
the arrangement of agents in space and appropriately chosen timing of the protocol.
Therefore, the description of the protocol must specify where and when each inter-
action takes place and then the resulting communication constraints may be used
to prove security. Note that not every combination of communication constraints
might be achieved in this model, e.g. if Alice simultaneously communicates with
Bob1 and Bob2, they must be able to communicate too.
To the best of our knowledge, the idea of combining relativity and quantum me-
chanics for cryptographic purposes first appeared in writing in a summary article
by Gilles Brassard and Claude Crépeau [BC96, Cré96], who attributed it to Louis
Salvail. The foundations were laid by Adrian Kent (first relativistic commitment
schemes [Ken99, Ken05]) and Roger Colbeck (proposals for various flavours of coin-
tossing and impossibility results for secure two-party computation [Col06, CK06,
Col07]). More recently, significant interest was sparked by position-verification
schemes [KMS11, BCF+11, TFKW13, Unr14, RG15]. A relativistic quantum key
distribution scheme has also been proposed [RKKM14].
The defining feature of relativistic cryptography is the requirement that different
phases of the protocol take place at distinct locations. With the appropriate choice
of timing this imposes communication constraints, which are no longer due to tech-
nological limitations but result directly from the physical theory (security of such
schemes is often advertised to be “guaranteed by the laws of physics”). Unfortunately,
this desirable feature comes at a price. Communication constraints guaranteed by
relativity are temporary, which means that we must leave the neat and tidy world
of non-communicating models, in which we are free to impose arbitrary commu-
nication constraints, and enter the complex world of relativistic models, in which
communication is only delayed rather than forbidden.1 The analysis of such scenar-
ios becomes significantly more involved if the agents are required to handle quantum
information (or when dishonest parties use quantum devices to cheat in a classical
protocol). In fact, this has led to interesting and fundamental questions about how
to define the location of a quantum system. Consider the process of teleportation
[BBC+93], in which a quantum state ρ located initially at one place is reconstructed
at another place by using entanglement (pre-shared between the two locations) and
sending classical data. Interestingly enough, during this procedure there is a period
of time when the state seemingly “ceases to exist”, in the sense that there is no loca-
1It is useful to contrast this aspect of relativistic models with the non-communicating case. In
the non-communicating world we can choose whether or not the agents are allowed to communicate
once the protocol is finished and both options are equally valid. In the relativistic setting there
is only one natural solution, which lies somewhere in between the two extremes: the agents can
communicate but their communication is not instantaneous.
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tion at which any information about ρ can be immediately extracted. Where is the
state then? This counter-intuitive phenomenon is captured operationally through
the task of summoning recently investigated by Kent [Ken13, Ken12a], Hayden and
May [HM12].
Outline: In this chapter we first show how some of the protocols discussed in
Chapter 3 can be implemented in the relativistic setting and what limitations such
a “translation” brings about. We then present an explicit procedure for mapping
a relativistic protocol onto a communication-constrained model. We show that in
the fully classical setting communication-constrained models can be further mapped
onto non-communicating models and we discuss why such a simplifying reduction
cannot be done when quantum information is involved. Finally, we discuss the power
and limitations of relativistic cryptography.
4.1 Non-communicating schemes in the relativistic
setting
We start by considering how some of the non-communicating schemes discussed in
Chapter 3 can be implemented in the relativistic setting. Since the communication
constraints imposed by relativity are temporary, the resulting commitment schemes
cannot guarantee everlasting security.2 Understanding exactly the “mode of failure”,
i.e. how different commitment schemes “expire”, provides valuable insight into the
power of relativistic cryptography.
The only realistic implementation of a relativistic protocol involves stationary
agents exchanging information at the speed of light. The protocol specifies a set
of locations and each party is required to delegate a (stationary) agent to each
location. All communication between Alice and Bob occurs locally, i.e. between
agents occupying the same location, and for simplicity we assume that all local
communication is instantaneous.3 Communication between distinct agents of the
same party is unrestricted (and assumed to be secure) but must respect the speed-
of-light constraint (for simplicity we take c = 1).4
2Unless the parties keep communicating, see Section 4.3 for more details.
3Note that this is the only reasonable model. If an agent of Alice were to send a message to
a far-away agent of Bob, she would either have to “escort” the message until it reaches the agent
of Bob (which is equivalent to placing an extra agent at the receiving end as in our model) or she
would let the message out unguarded, in which case there is no guarantee that the message will
not be intercepted by some other agent of Bob at some earlier location.
4Security of internal communication can be ensured by using teleportation to transmit quantum
states and information-theoretic encryption (one-time pad) for classical information. Alternatively,
we can assume that distinct agents occupy different locations within the same laboratory (e.g. the
model of two long laboratories in a single spatial dimension as in Section 1.7.2 and Fig. 1.6 of
Ref. [Col06]).
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All examples considered in this thesis take place in a single spatial dimension
labelled by x and as usual time is labelled by t. All considerations in this chapter
extend in a straightforward fashion to more spatial dimensions but we are not aware
of any examples in which this gives any advantage. We label the locations by integers
and refer to the agents occupying Location k as Alicek and Bobk. For convenience
we define the following three locations.
Location 0 x = 0
Location 1 x = −1
Location 2 x = 1
It is important to bear in mind that in relativistic protocols all the interactions
are performed by agents occupying well-defined locations. We avoid referring to the
main party (whose location during the protocol is not specified) as it might create the
impression that there exists some higher form of life that is able to instantaneously
communicate with all its agents. The existence of such a being is forbidden by
relativity and would indeed render all the relativistic protocols insecure.
Let us first present a relativistic variant of Protocol 2. Before the protocol begins
Alice1 and Alice2 must be provided with a random bit a ∈ {0, 1} (e.g. generated by
Alice0 at t = −1).
Protocol 5: Bit commitment from secret sharing (relativistic)
1. (commit) At t = 0, Alice1 sends x1 = d⊕a to Bob1 and Alice2 sends x2 = a
to Bob2. Bob1 and Bob2 immediately send x1 and x2 to Bob0.
2. (open and verify) At t = 1, Bob0 receives x1 and x2 and computes the
commitment as d = x1 ⊕ x2.
In a sense this protocol is easier to understand than the original, non-communicating
version (cf. the spacetime diagram in Fig. 4.1). It is clear that Alice becomes com-
mitted at t = 0 (the commitment point) and that the commitment becomes known
to Bob (Bob0 to be more specific) at t = 1 (the opening point), hence, the commit-
ment is valid for t ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, in the non-communicating variant
it is not a priori clear when (and why!) communication constraints vanish and the
commitment opens. Just like in Protocol 4, Alice1 can single-handedly decide on
the commitment and the choice can be delayed until t = 0.
Our second example is a relativistic variant of Protocol 4. This time Alice1 and
Alice2 must share a random n-bit string a ∈ {0, 1}n.
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t = 0
t
t = 1
Alice1 Bob1 Alice2 Bob2
Bob0
Fig. 4.1: Spacetime diagram for Protocol 5. The red dots represent the commit
phase while the blue dot represents the open phase. The shaded areas correspond
to the future light cones of the interactions in the commit phase.
Protocol 6: Simplified-BGKW (relativistic)
1. (commit) At t = 0, Bob1 sends y1 = b to Alice1 and she replies with
x1 = d · y1 ⊕ a. Bob1 immediately sends x1 to Bob2.
2. (open) At t ∈ (0, 2), Alice2 reveals x2 = a to Bob2.
3. (verify) At t = 2, Bob2 receives x1 and verifies that x1 ⊕ x2 = d · b.
Just like in Protocol 4, Alice1 can choose the value of the commitment single-
handedly and this choice can be delayed until t = 0 (Alice2 does not need to know it).
The requirement that the open phase happens at t < 2 ensures that no signals can be
sent between the commit and open phases (cf. Fig. 4.2). It is easy to see that Alice2
could cheat perfectly if she knew b so the timing must be chosen such that b, which
is announced by Bob1 at t = 0, is not available to Alice2 during the open phase.
Under this condition the relativistic protocol and the original, non-communicating
version are equivalent as far as security is concerned.
Note that in this relativistic scheme there is always a non-zero delay in verifying
the commitment but it can be made arbitrarily small.5 Whether this constitutes a
severe limitation or not depends on the particular application but this feature, which
appears often in relativistic protocols, should be always kept in mind, especially
5The possibility of immediate verification of the opening would imply that the commit phase
and the open phase are not space-like separated. Then, there would have been enough time for b
to reach Alice2, which would render the protocol insecure.
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t = 0
t
Alice1 Bob1
t < 2
Alice2 Bob2
t = 2
Bob2
Fig. 4.2: Spacetime diagram for Protocol 6. The red dot represents the commit
phase, the blue dot represents the open phase, the green dot corresponds to the
point at which Bob2 verifies the commitment.
when considering composability (i.e. executing a relativistic scheme as a subroutine
in a longer procedure).
It is instructive to consider what happens if for some reason the open phase does
not happen in the interval t ∈ (0, 2). At t = 2 dishonest Alice2 receives b (sent
by dishonest Alice1 at t = 0) and at this point she can provide a valid proof for
either value of d, which makes the protocol completely insecure. In other words, the
commitment expires at t = 2 and no opening should be accepted at (or after) that
point. If Alice2 does not perform the opening during t ∈ (0, 2), Bob will never find
out whether Alice1 made an honest commitment, let alone its value.
Having presented two cases in which non-communicating protocols can be turned
in a straightforward manner into relativistic protocols, let us briefly discuss one case
in which such a simple translation is not possible. Recall Protocol 1 for distributed
oblivious transfer presented in Section 3.2. Security of this protocol hinges on the
assumption that Bob1 and Bob2 cannot communicate from the beginning of the pro-
tocol until the end of time. We know that permanent communication constraints
cannot be enforced by relativity so we cannot hope for everlasting security but tem-
porary security is not immediately ruled out. To restrict communication between
Bob1 and Bob2 we would have to place them at distant locations, as usual accompa-
nied by their communication partners Alice1 and Alice2. During the protocol each
Alice receives a single message and the message that they actually want to obtain
is the XOR of the two. Unfortunately, the earliest point at which the transmitted
message might be reconstructed coincides with the point at which the information
gathered by Bob1 and Bob2 can be recombined to reveal which message Alice chose to
retrieve (the spacetime diagram is essentially identical to the one shown in Fig. 4.1).
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We could have hoped for some finite interval during which Alice already knows the
message but Bob still remains ignorant about her choice but in case of Protocol 1
this is not possible. This shows that not all non-communicating protocols can be
mapped directly onto the relativistic setting in a meaningful way.
4.2 Explicit analysis of relativistic protocols
We have seen how simple non-communicating protocols can be implemented in the
relativistic setting but so far the security analysis was rather ad hoc. While this
is sufficient for simple schemes, for more complex protocols (involving more agents
and/or multiple rounds, which might be necessary to achieve improved security fea-
tures, e.g. longer commitment time) a systematic approach is desirable. In this
section we provide a solution to a subclass of these problems and discuss the com-
plications arising while dealing with the most general case.
A relativistic protocol is classical if all the messages exchange between agents of
Alice and agents of Bob are classical. A protocol is quantum if there is at least one
quantum message. Since classical protocols are designed to be executed by classical
parties they should not require the agents of Alice or Bob to perform quantum
operations in the honest scenario. However, this cannot be ruled out in the dishonest
case and it is natural to study the security of classical protocols against quantum
adversaries.
We first consider classical protocols and we show that analysing the dishonest
scenario is equivalent to a certain multiplayer game with partial communication con-
straints6 played by the agents of the dishonest party.7 In Section 4.2.1 we show that
if the agents are restricted to classical strategies, the situation is equivalent to a
multiplayer game of non-communicating players. In Section 4.2.2 we mention some
complications that arise when analysing such games against quantum players. Fi-
nally, in Section 4.2.3 we discuss briefly the problems related to quantum relativistic
protocols.
For the sake of concreteness let us consider the case of honest Alice. Since the
agents of Alice follow the protocol, we might think of them as an omnipresent referee,
who interacts with the agents of Bob. The following simple procedure explains how
to turn a relativistic protocol into a multiplayer game (similar to those described in
Section 2.3) such that winning the game is equivalent to cheating in the protocol.
1. Identify all points of spacetime at which the agents of Alice and Bob interact,
6Similar models have been previously studied from the foundational point of view under the
name of time-ordered models [GWC+14] or correlation scenarios [Fri12, Fri14].
7Note that this procedure is not specific to commitment schemes and applies to any relativistic
protocol in which cheating can be cast as a game.
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order them by their time coordinate and label by (positive) integers.8 With-
out loss of generality we assume that every interaction consists of a challenge
from Alice followed by a response from Bob, which for the jth interaction are
denoted by cj and rj, respectively.9 Let (xj, tj) be the spacetime coordinates
of the jth interaction and let n be the total number of interactions in the pro-
tocol. Construct the communication graph G = ([n], E), in which each vertex
corresponds to an interaction and the set of (directed) edges is determined by
the causality constraints. More precisely, (j, k) is an edge iff k is in the future
light cone of j
(j, k) ∈ E ⇐⇒ |xk − xj| ≤ tk − tj.
Note that G is an oriented and acyclic graph.
2. Without loss of generality the challenge issued by Alice in the jth interaction
is a deterministic function of some pre-shared randomness (represented by a
random variable Z) and the previous responses of Bob. For a particular value
of the random variable Z = z we have
cj = fj(z, r1, r2, . . . , rj−1).
(Clearly, fj might not depend on the responses which do not belong to the
past light cone of the jth interaction but to keep the notation simple we do
not indicate this restriction explicitly.) The collection of functions f1, f2, . . . , fn
together with the probability distribution of Z fully determines the distribution
of challenges issued by Alice.
3. Deciding whether a cheating attempt is successful, i.e. the predicate function
for the game, might without loss of generality be taken to depend only on the
initial randomness and the responses from Bob, i.e. V (z, r1, r2, . . . , rn).
This procedure provides us with three components: the communication graph, the
distribution of challenges and the predicate function. Clearly, this triple defines a
multiplayer game in which communication, instead of being completely forbidden,
is restricted. More specifically, we can identify the jth interaction with a player Pj
and starting from j = 1 every player takes part in the following procedure.
1. Player Pj receives messages sent by previous players.
2. Player Pj receives a challenge cj and issues a response rj.
3. Player Pj might send a message to any player Pk such that (j, k) ∈ E.
8For interactions occurring at the same time the order does not matter.
9If the protocol requires more rounds of communications in a sequence, consider them as separate
interactions.
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At the end all the answers are collected and the predicate function V is evaluated
to determine whether the game is won or lost.
Since quantum communication can be implemented by teleportation (and we do
not impose any restrictions on the amount of entanglement shared by the players)
we can assume all communication to be classical.
Let us summarise what we have accomplished so far. We have started from
a classical relativistic protocol and we have turned it into an equivalent classical
multiplayer game with communication constraints. Note that by classical we mean
that all the challenges and responses are classical but this does not prevent the
players from using quantum systems to generate them. As discussed in the next
section, the case of quantum players (i.e. players using quantum systems to generate
their classical responses) is significantly harder to analyse than the case of classical
players.
Note that multiplayer games with communication constraints include many in-
teresting scenarios as special cases. For example if E = ∅ (i.e. the communica-
tion graph G has no edges) we recover the standard scenario of multiplayer non-
communicating games. The other extreme case is when the players satisfy a “total
order”, i.e. (j, k) ∈ E ⇐⇒ k > j, which is equivalent to a single player respond-
ing to a sequence of challenges. This is exactly the scenario that arises in classical
non-relativistic two-party cryptography.10
4.2.1 Classical players
Any strategy available to classical players can be expressed as a convex combination
of deterministic strategies. Since randomness can be shared among the players
in advance and their goal is to achieve the optimal winning probability (which is
determined by a fixed and known function), we might restrict our attention to
deterministic strategies. What is the most general strategy of Pj, i.e. what is his
response allowed to depend on? Clearly, it might depend on the challenge that he
receives cj but it might also depend on messages received by him from the “previous”
players. This seems to complicate the situation, since these might be arbitrary
and depend on anything that was available to the sender, etc. However, a simple
observation allows us to simplify this seemingly complicated structure. Since the
message sent by a particular player is a function of the data available to him, he
could alternatively send the whole data set to the receiver, who can then generate the
10These two special cases have also been studied if the challenges and/or responses are quan-
tum. For some recent results on two-player quantum games see Refs. [RV13, CJPPG15] while for
sequential quantum games see papers on quantum non-relativistic two-party cryptography listed
in Section 1.3.
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message himself. This leads to the simple conclusion that it is optimal11 to broadcast
any challenge received from the referee to all eligible players. Then the response of
Pj becomes a deterministic function of all the challenges in his past. If we supply
every player with these additional inputs, they no longer need to communicate. This
reduction works because there exists a trivial but optimal communication strategy
for the players, namely “broadcast everything”.
Observation 4.1. Let G1 be the game in which Pj receives cj and the allowed
communication pattern is specified by G = ([n], E). Let G2 be the game in which
Pj receives {ck}k∈Sj where
Sj := {k ∈ [n] : (k, j) ∈ E}
and no communication is allowed G = ([n], ∅). The sets of strategies available to
the classical players in games G1 and G2 are identical.
This observation plays a crucial role in the analysis of a multiround classical rela-
tivistic bit commitment protocol in Chapter 6.
4.2.2 Quantum players
We have seen that for classical players games with communication constraints can
be reduced to fully non-communicating games. What happens if we attempt such a
reduction for quantum players?
As one might expect the quantum case is not so simple and it is instructive to
consider the following example. Consider a game of three players where G contains
only one edge, E = {(1, 2)}. Clearly, P3 cannot communicate with the other players
but his presence is necessary to hope for a quantum advantage.12 The response of
P1 is determined by some measurement he performs on his quantum system (and
the measurement setting depends on the challenge c1). Then he passes whatever is
left of the quantum system along with the classical messages c1 and r1 to P2 who
then receives c2 and completely measures the quantum system to obtain r2.
This scenario is difficult to analyse because the measurement performed by P1
affects how much information P2 (who learns a new piece of information c2) might
extract from the state. This problem goes under the name of sequential measure-
ments and is currently an active area of research [HM15]. Note that in the classical
setting such trade-offs do not exist: generating the response for the current round
does not affect the information that might be sent to other players.
11Optimal in the sense of spreading information to the largest number of players, certainly not
in terms of efficiency.
12 Without P3 we would have a game equivalent to asking a sequence of classical questions to a
single player and in such games no quantum advantage is possible.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the simplest example in which finding
the quantum value of a classical game cannot be reduced to any of the previously
studied models. Interestingly enough, this is precisely the scenario which arises
when analysing security of the multiround protocol presented in Chapter 6 against
quantum adversaries.
4.2.3 Quantum relativistic protocols
While presenting the procedure to map a relativistic protocol onto a communication-
constrained model, we have explicitly restricted ourselves to classical protocols. This
was mainly to avoid the trouble of specifying the most general way in which the
referee may choose the challenge. While this is conceptually not difficult, formalising
these notions would be quite cumbersome. In particular, we would need to explicitly
define the Hilbert spaces corresponding to the referee’s memory, the “message” space,
define the class of operations the referee might use to prepare the challenge, argue
what the new predicate is, etc.13
While mapping a quantum relativistic protocol onto a quantum game is not dif-
ficult, we do not know how to analyse the resulting “quantum” games. Without
aiming for full generality let us just sketch out two quantum games, which demon-
strate difficulties that might arise in these scenarios.
The first game is a variation on the example presented in the previous section.
Basically, by making the first challenge c1 quantum we can eliminate P3 without
trivialising the problem. Consider a game of two players P1,P2 such that E =
{(1, 2)}. The challenge received by P1 is an unknown quantum state and he is
required to give a classical response r1. P1 passes the remaining quantum state
together with his classical response to P2, who receives a new (classical) challenge
and must produce another classical response. Clearly, the information extractable
in the second round depends on the measurement performed in the first one, hence,
the two rounds cannot be decoupled and mapped onto a non-communicating model.
Games of this type arise when considering quantum non-relativistic protocols.
The second game is arguably the simplest manifestation of no-cloning. Con-
sider a game of three players whose communication graph contains two edges:
E = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}. The challenge issued to P1 is an unknown quantum state and
no response is required. Players P2 and P3 are then challenged to unveil one out
of two incompatible properties of the original state. Clearly, this would be easy if
each of them could hold a copy of the original state but this is forbidden by the
no-cloning theorem. One solution is for P1 to measure one of the two properties
and send the classical outcomes to P2 and P3. However, this only allows them to
13Note that as a special case we must recover the standard model for quantum protocols of Yao
[Yao95], which puts a lower bound on the complexity of the description.
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answer one of the challenges correctly. This is exactly the quantum feature used
in Kent’s quantum relativistic bit commitment protocol [Ken12b], whose complete
analysis can be found in Chapter 5.
4.3 Limitations of relativistic cryptography
We have made contributions towards understanding of relativistic commitment schemes
but in general the exact power of relativistic cryptography is not yet completely un-
derstood. The goal of this section is to summarise what is known to be possible
and what the known limitations are. It turns out that between the two there is a
sizeable piece of land yet to be discovered.
Let us start with the simplest task: coin tossing. The trivial classical protocol
(described for example as Protocol 2.3 in Ref. [Col06]), in which Alice1 sends a
random bit to Bob1 and simultaneously Bob2 sends a random bit to Alice2 and the
outcome of the coin toss is the XOR of the two bits, achieves perfect security and is
easily implemented in the simplest relativistic model with just two locations. More
sophisticated flavours of coin tossing, in which Alice and Bob can partially influence
the bias of the coin, are also possible [Col06].
The situation becomes a bit more complicated when it comes to bit commitment.
All the commitment protocols we have discussed so far expire in some way: in
case of Protocol 5 the commitment automatically opens, in case of Protocol 6 the
commitment vanishes. In principle these commitments can be made arbitrarily long
but only at the price of increasing the spatial separation between the sites. This is
clearly not a desirable solution, since in practice we are restricted to a fixed region
of space (we have easy access to the surface of the Earth but going beyond that
seems somewhat impractical). Can we achieve an arbitrarily long commitment while
performing the protocol in a finite region of space? Let us first consider protocols
in which the commit phase only requires a finite amount of communication, i.e. at
some point the communication stops and no more messages need to be exchanged
until the open phase. It is clear that at that point both parties could bring all
their systems together and within some period of time (proportional to the size of
the accessible region of space) we would be back in the standard scenario, in which
the usual trade-offs apply. Hence, arbitrarily long commitment cannot be achieved
by a protocol with a bounded number of messages in the commit phase. What
about protocols in which the agents keep communicating? The multiround scheme
presented in Chapter 6 belongs to this class and implements bit commitment which is
secure against classical adversaries and can be made arbitrarily long. We conjecture
that the protocol remains secure against quantum adversaries but we currently do
not have a proof.
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Commitments with a finite period of validity (which at some point expire) have
been previously studied under the name of timed commitments. For example Boneh
and Naor [BN00] study commitments which fail in the same way as Protocol 5,
i.e. after some fixed time the committed value is revealed to Bob.14 They show that
such commitments can be used for contract signing or honesty-preserving auctions.
Generally speaking, such temporary secrecy is sufficient if the goal is to force parties
to act simultaneously (in the sense that their respective actions should not depend
on each other) even if the communication model is sequential. Broadbent and Tapp
considered the task of secure voting, for which such commitments would be sufficient
[BT08]. Timed commitments that vanish (i.e. the commitment is no longer valid
but the committed value, if there was one, remains secret) can be used in similar
situations if we want to give Alice more power to protect her privacy. This type of
commitment might also be used in multiparty protocols which are robust against
a certain fraction of dishonest parties (then any party that refuses to open the
commitment would be declared dishonest).
To see the limitations of relativistic commitment schemes it is instructive to in-
vestigate whether they can be used to implement other, more powerful primitives.
For example, a well-known construction shows how to use bit commitment and
quantum communication to implement oblivious transfer [BBCS92, Yao95]. Are
relativistic schemes suitable for this canonical construction? Without going into too
many details let us describe one important feature of this construction. At some
point of the procedure Bob is required to make several commitments. Later, Al-
ice asks Bob to open a random subset of them but the rest he keeps untouched.
Security for Bob hinges on the fact that some commitments remain closed, which
rules out relativistic schemes that expire by opening (like Protocol 5). The commit-
ments that vanish without revealing any information (like Protocol 6) might seem
perfectly suited for the task. However, a simple conceptual problem referred to as
classical certification or retractability arises [Ken12c, Col06]. Basically, the canoni-
cal construction implicitly assumes that every commitment (including the unopened
ones) has a value. While it might not be immediately clear what it means for an
unopened commitment to have a value, this concept can be made rigorous and it
is possible to show that relativistic protocols do not satisfy this property. A more
detailed discussion on the issue of classical certification of relativistic commitment
schemes and an explicit example how it renders the canonical construction insecure
can be found in Appendix A. While this is by no means a proof that no relativistic
commitment scheme can be used for the canonical construction, we have at least
ruled out the ones considered so far.
14Their motivation comes from schemes which only offer computational security. Such schemes
can always be forced open given enough time and computational power.
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What about implementing relativistic oblivious transfer directly without going
through canonical construction? This possibility seems unlikely due to the following
informal argument. In every (correct) oblivious transfer protocol at some fixed
point Alice must receive the chosen message. At this point the knowledge of Alice
(or Bob) might be scattered among all their agents but in an attempt to cheat
it can be (within some finite time) gathered at one location and then the usual
impossibility results apply. Investigating whether this intuition can be turned into a
rigorous argument would be an interesting research problem for two reasons: it would
require us to propose a meaningful definition of relativistic oblivious transfer and the
actual impossibility result (if true) would determine an important boundary point
of quantum relativistic cryptography. Alternatively, one can relax the requirements
and look for a protocol whose security is only guaranteed for a finite period of time.
Such protocols might exist and it would be interesting to know how useful they are.
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Chapter 5
Bit commitment by transmitting
measurement outcomes
This chapter is based on
• Experimental bit commitment based on quantum communication
and special relativity [arXiv:1306.4801]
T. Lunghi, J. Kaniewski, F. Bussières, R. Houlmann, M. Tomamichel, A. Kent,
N. Gisin, S. Wehner and H. Zbinden
Physical Review Letters 111, 180504 (2013).
(presented at QCrypt ’13)
In the previous chapters we have seen why non-communicating models are useful
in cryptography and how such models can be implemented using relativity. In
this chapter we use the tools introduced before and present a complete analysis
of a particular quantum relativistic bit commitment protocol proposed by Kent
[Ken12b]. Our initial approach to this problem, presented in Ref. [KTHW13], relied
on some tools from non-asymptotic quantum information theory and a recently
discovered uncertainty relation [TR11, Tom12]. Later, however, we found another,
simpler approach (which does not explicitly use any uncertainty relation), which we
then extended to apply to experimental implementations [LKB+13]. In this chapter
we only present the latter, superior method. Note that similar techniques found
applications to other interesting problems in quantum cryptography [TFKW13].
(During the lifetime of these projects an independent security analysis of the same
protocol was provided by Croke and Kent [CK12] and an independent experiment
was performed by Liu, Cao, Curty, Liao, Wang, Cui, Li, Lin, Sun, Li, Zhang, Zhao,
Chen, Peng, Zhang, Cabello and Pan [LCC+14]).
Outline: We start by proving security of the original protocol. Our methods are
robust, as they also apply to the case of imperfect state preparation and noisy
transmission. This would be sufficient to prove security of an implementation that
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uses a single-photon source, a lossless quantum channel and perfect detectors (or
devices which are good approximations thereof). Unfortunately, such devices are not
available at the moment, hence, we modify the protocol so it can be implemented
using currently available devices, in our case a weak-coherent source and inefficient
and noisy detectors. We describe the new security model, extend the previous
security analysis and determine the minimum requirements on the honest devices
that allow for a secure implementation of the protocol. We also present an explicit
calculation of the security parameter of the protocol. We finish this chapter by
giving a brief overview of an experiment performed between Geneva and Singapore
in collaboration with an experimental group at the University of Geneva.
5.1 The original protocol
We use the following notation for the BB84 states
|ψθx〉 = Hθ|x〉, (5.1)
where x, θ ∈ {0, 1}. For a sequence of BB84 states described by x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n we
use
|xθ〉 =
n⊗
k=1
|ψθkxk〉. (5.2)
For a particular basis string θ ∈ {0, 1}n we define S and T to be the rounds in which
Alice encoded her qubits in the computational and Hadamard basis, respectively,
S = {k ∈ [n] : θk = 0},
T = {k ∈ [n] : θk = 1}.
The protocol proposed by Kent [Ken12b] uses the same locations as described in
Section 4.1 and Fig. 5.1 shows the relevant spacetime diagram. The parameter n ∈ N
determines the usual cost vs. security trade-off (see Section 2.4), while δ ∈ [0, 1)
specifies the noise tolerance of the protocol. Recall that dH(·, ·) is the fractional
Hamming distance (defined in Section 2.1.1).
Protocol 7: Bit commitment by transmitting measurement outcomes
1. (commit) At t = 0, Bob0 chooses x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random,
creates |xθ〉 and sends it to Alice0. Alice0 measures all the incoming qubits
in the same basis (computational if d = 0 and Hadamard if d = 1) to
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t = 0
t
t = 1
Alice0 Bob0
Alice1 Bob1 Alice2 Bob2
Fig. 5.1: Spacetime diagram for Protocol 7. The red dot represents the commit
phase while the blue dots represent the open phase. The shaded area corresponds
to the past light cones of the events of the open phase.
produce y ∈ {0, 1}n (the string of measurement outcomes), which she then
sends to Alice1 and Alice2.
2. (open) At t = 1, Alice1 and Alice2 simultaneously send d and y to Bob1
and Bob2, respectively.
3. (verify) Bob1 and Bob2 pass all the information to Bob0, who verifies that:
• Alice1 and Alice2 have attempted to unveil the same value
• Alice1 and Alice2 have provided exactly the same string y
• the string y is consistent with the BB84 states initially prepared by
Bob0 up to the error threshold δ
dH(xS, yS) ≤ δ for d = 0,
dH(xT , yT ) ≤ δ for d = 1.
If all three conditions are satisfied, Bob0 accepts the commitment.
Before we proceed with a complete analysis let us mention a couple of unusual
features of the protocol.
First of all, it seems that Alice becomes committed without actually sending
any information to Bob (no communication from Alice to Bob happens until the
open phase). Is that possible? How can Bob be sure that for t > 0 Alice is indeed
committed?
To answer this question it is instructive to consider a slight variation on Protocol
7, in which the open phase is delayed until t = 2. Clearly, in this case Alice0
could keep the quantum states untouched until t = 1 and only then perform the
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measurement. For this modified protocol Alice only becomes committed at t = 1,
which does not occur immediately after the communication in the commit phase is
over (as was the case in all the previous protocols).
This quantum protocol challenges the preconception that the timing of the com-
mitment point is determined by the interactions in the commit phase. Strangely
enough, in this case the commitment point is determined by the timing of and lo-
cations used in the open phase. In fact, it is easy to see that the commitment point
is determined by the latest point in the common past of the openings performed by
Alice1 and Alice2.
Protocols discussed in Section 4.1 result in commitments which are only valid
for a finite amount of time (in case of Protocol 5 the commitment at some point
automatically opens while in case of Protocol 6 at some point security for honest Bob
is lost). It is interesting to note that the quantum commitment scheme we consider
now does not expire. A commitment initiated at t = 0 may be opened at any
t = topen > 1 but a successful opening only demonstrates that Alice was committed
for t ∈ (topen−1, topen). It is important to stress that at t = topen−1 Alice is not yet
committed, so we must take the commitment point to be t = topen − 1 + r, where
r > 0 is an arbitrarily small (but non-zero) constant.
Finally, let us point out that verifying whether an opening should be accepted
or not is not immediate. Moreover, in contrast to Protocol 6, the delay cannot be
made arbitrarily small. Since the conditions that Bob needs to verify depend on
data unveiled at both opening locations, the delay is proportional to the distance
between them.
5.1.1 Correctness
Correctness in the noiseless setting is clear by inspection while for an experimental
implementation the only relevant quantity turns out to be the total bit-flip error rate
between (honest) Alice and Bob (this rate includes contributions coming from imper-
fect state preparation, transmission noise and measurement errors). For simplicity
we assume that noise acts independently on every qubit. Let err be the bit-flip error
rate, i.e. the probability of obtaining the wrong outcome despite the qubit having
been prepared and measured in the same basis.1 The protocol is asymptotically
correct (i.e. the probability of honest parties aborting decays exponentially in n) if
err < δ. (5.3)
1If the error probabilities are different for the two bases, we take the larger value to be on the
safe side.
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Note that this depends solely on the numerical value of err and not on the exact
effects that contribute to it.
5.1.2 Security for honest Alice
Since Bob receives no information before the open phase, he remains completely
ignorant about Alice’s commitment and so the protocol is hiding.
5.1.3 Security for honest Bob
To investigate security for honest Bob we first turn the original prepare-and-measure
scheme of Kent into an entanglement-based scheme (equivalence for security pur-
poses was explained in Section 2.2.3). In the entanglement-based formulation instead
of generating BB84 states Bob0 generates EPR pairs, he keeps one half of each (to
be measured later) and sends the other halves to Alice0. The most general attack
performed by Alice0 during the commit phase is to perform an isometry that “splits
up” the entire quantum system received from Bob0 into two parts, which she then
sends to Alice1 and Alice2. In the open phase, Alice1 and Alice2 measure their
respective quantum systems and pass the outcomes to Bob1 and Bob2, respectively.
Since we want to prove security with respect to the global command variant of
Definition 3.2 let us spell out how this definition applies to the protocol.2
First, we need to characterise the set of states that Alice0 might enforce at the
commitment point. While at t = 0 the state is (without loss of generality) only
shared between Alice0 and Bob0, at the commitment point (t = r > 0) the share
of Alice0 is already explicitly split up into two parts (that will reach Alice1 and
Alice2 in time for the open phase) and this partitioning is essential to determine
the commitment. We denote the relevant subsystems by A1 and A2 (even if at the
commitment point these subsystems are not with the agents Alice1 and Alice2 yet).
It is straightforward to see that at the commitment point any tripartite state σBA1A2
can be enforced as long as the marginal state held by Bob0 remains unchanged, i.e.
trA1A2 σBA1A2 =
(1
2
)⊗n
.
Interestingly enough, our proof does not make use of this property. In other words,
the protocol remains secure even if Alice0 were allowed to provide an arbitrary
tripartite state compatible with the measurements that Bob0 will later perform
(i.e. the subsystem of Bob0 must consist of n qubits).
In the open phase Alice1 and Alice2 must provide proofs, which are just classical
strings of length n. Hence, the opening maps correspond to measurements. Each
2Security in the local command can be achieved by the trivial Protocol 3, cf. Section 3.3.
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of Alice1 and Alice2 has two different measurements used to unveil the two differ-
ent values of the commitment and we denote the measurement operators of Alice1
(Alice2) attempting to unveil d by {P dy }y∈{0,1}n
({Qdy}y∈{0,1}n). Since we do not
impose any constraints on the local dimensions of A1 and A2 we may without loss
of generality assume that these measurements are projective. The fact that Alice2
might use different measurements for d = 0 and d = 1 indicates that we work in the
global command model.
If θ ∈ {0, 1}n is the basis string (picked by Bob0 uniformly at random), then his
measurement is described by operators {|xθ〉〈xθ |}x∈{0,1}n as defined in Eq. (5.2). The
commitment is accepted if the strings supplied by Alice1 and Alice2 are consistent
with the classical outcomes obtained by Bob0. This condition can be written as a
projector acting on the original tripartite state and it is easy to see that the projector
Πθd corresponding to Bob0 accepting the unveiling of d for a particular basis string
θ equals
Πθ0 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
∑
y∈{0,1}n
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗Q0y,
Πθ1 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
∑
y∈{0,1}n
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
P 1y ⊗Q1y,
and the three registers correspond to the subsystems held by Bob0, Alice1 and
Alice2, respectively (and the latter two result from an isometry applied by Alice0 to
subsystem A0, which she received in the commit phase). These projectors require
that Alice1 and Alice2 unveil the same string, which on the relevant subset (S for
d = 0 and T for d = 1) is δ-close (in terms of fractional Hamming distance) to the
string obtained by Bob. To calculate the probability of successfully unveiling d we
must average over all possible basis choices
pd = 2
−n ∑
θ∈{0,1}n
tr(ΠθdσBA1A2).
In fact, our technique allows us to generalise the definition (5.1) to any pair of bases
on a qubit
〈ψ00 |ψ01〉 = 〈ψ10 |ψ11〉 = 0.
This requirement comes directly from the fact that the equivalence between prepare-
and-measure and entanglement-based schemes as presented in Section 2.2.3 only
applies if the average state is fully mixed. It turns out that the final bound depends
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only on the overlap between the bases
c := max
x,y
|〈ψ0x |ψ1y〉|, (5.4)
which is a well-known measure of incompatibility used extensively in the study of
uncertainty relations [Deu83, MU88, BCC+09, TR11].
Proposition 5.1. Let
λ0 =
1 + c
2
and λ1 =
1− c
2
,
where c is the overlap as defined in Eq. (5.4). For any strategy of dishonest Alice,
the probabilities of Bob accepting the commitment satisfy
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε,
for
ε =

λn0 for δ = 0,
exp
(
− 1
2
(√
λ1 − δ√λ1
)2
n
)
for 0 < δ < λ1.
(5.5)
Proof. Let us write the sum out explicitly
p0 + p1 = 2
−n∑
θ
tr
(
[Πθ0 + Π
θ
1]σBA1A2
)
. (5.6)
Adding up the two projectors (for a particular value of θ) gives
Πθ0 + Π
θ
1 =
∑
x
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
[ ∑
y
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗Q0y +
∑
y
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
P 1y ⊗Q1y
]
.
The terms in the square bracket can be upper bounded by replacing one of the
measurement operators by the identity matrix. Therefore,∑
y
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗Q0y +
∑
y
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
P 1y ⊗Q1y ≤
∑
y
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗ 1 + 1⊗
∑
y
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
Q1y
≤ 1⊗ 1 +
∑
y
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗
∑
z
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
Q1z,
where the last step follows from the following operator inequality
A⊗ 1 + 1⊗B = 1⊗ 1 + A⊗B − (1− A)⊗ (1−B) ≤ 1⊗ 1 + A⊗B, (5.7)
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which holds for any 0 ≤ A,B ≤ 1. Therefore,
Πθ0 + Π
θ
1 ≤
∑
x
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗ 1⊗ 1 + Πθc = 1⊗ 1⊗ 1 + Πθc , (5.8)
where
Πθc =
∑
x
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
∑
y
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗
∑
z
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
Q1z
is a projector for the “cross-game”, in which Alice1 has to unveil a string consistent
with d = 0 and Alice2 has to unveil a string consistent with d = 1.3 Combining
Eqs. (5.6) and (5.8) gives
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + 2−n
∑
θ
tr
(
ΠθcσBA1A2
)
= 1 + tr
(〈Πθc〉σBA1A2) ≤ 1 + ||〈Πθc〉||,
where 〈·〉 denotes averaging over θ, i.e. 〈Πθc〉 = 2−n
∑
θ Π
θ
c , and || · || denotes the
Schatten ∞-norm (defined in Section 2.2.1). Changing the order of summation in
Πθc gives
Πθc =
∑
y,z
∑
x
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗ P 0y ⊗Q1z.
Now, it is clear that only the x-dependent part needs to be averaged:
〈Πθc〉 = 2−n
∑
θ
Πθc =
∑
y,z
Byz ⊗ P 0y ⊗Q1z,
where
Byz = 2
−n∑
θ
∑
x
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
|xθ〉〈xθ |.
Since the product P 0y ⊗Q1z yields orthogonal projectors, we have
||〈Πθc〉|| = max
y,z
||Byz||. (5.9)
To identify values of y and z which maximise the norm we take a closer look at the
matrices Byz. For every θ define u(θ) to be the string that satisfies [u(θ)]S = yS and
3Our security analysis goes through a thought experiment in which Alice1 and Alice2 are chal-
lenged to unveil different bits and in the current method this connection is made through the
operator inequality (5.7). Interestingly enough, our previous method relies on the same idea but
expressed at the level of no-signalling probability distributions (see Lemma V.1 of Ref. [KTHW13]).
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[u(θ)]T = zT . Relabelling x 7→ x⊕ u(θ) yields
Byz = 2
−n∑
θ
∑
x
wH(xS)≤δ
wH(xT )≤δ
|(x⊕ u(θ))θ〉〈(x⊕ u(θ))θ |.
The constraints on the second sum can be relaxed by noting that wH(xS) ≤ δ and
wH(xT ) ≤ δ imply wH(x) ≤ δ. Therefore,
Byz ≤ B′yz = 2−n
∑
θ
∑
x
wH(x)≤δ
|(x⊕ u(θ))θ〉〈(x⊕ u(θ))θ |,
which makes the second sum independent of θ. Hence, the summation over θ can
be performed first and due to the tensor product structure we have
|xθ〉〈xθ | =
n⊗
k=1
|ψθkxk〉〈ψθkxk |
and ∑
θ
. . . ⇐⇒
n⊗
k=1
∑
θk∈{0,1}
. . . .
Therefore,
2−n
∑
θ
|(x⊕ u(θ))θ〉〈(x⊕ u(θ))θ | =
n⊗
k=1
ρxk⊕yk,xk⊕zk .
where
ρb,c =
1
2
(|ψ0b 〉〈ψ0b |+ |ψ1c 〉〈ψ1c |)
for b, c ∈ {0, 1}. Note that ρb,c + ρ1−b,1−c = 1 so they are diagonal in the same basis.
Therefore, without loss of generality we can write
ρb,c =
∑
t∈{0,1}
λb⊕ct |eb⊕ct 〉〈eb⊕ct |,
for b, c ∈ {0, 1}, where λb⊕c0 + λb⊕c1 = 1. In particular, we have( n⊗
k=1
ρxk⊕yk,xk⊕zk
)( n⊗
k=1
|eyk⊕zkvk 〉
)
=
n⊗
k=1
λyk⊕zkxk⊕yk⊕vk |eyk⊕zkvk 〉.
Therefore, we also know the eigenbasis of
B′yz =
∑
x
wH(x)≤δ
n⊗
k=1
ρxk⊕yk,xk⊕zk ,
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and the largest eigenvalue equals
||B′yz|| = max
v
∑
x
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λyk⊕zkxk⊕yk⊕vk .
Recall from Eq. (5.9) that the expression we want to bound is
max
y,z
||B′yz|| = max
v,y,z
∑
x
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λyk⊕zkxk⊕yk⊕vk = maxa,b
∑
x
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λakxk⊕bk .
It is clear that every bit of a and b should be chosen to satisfy λakbk = maxs,t λ
t
s := λ0.
Then
max
y,z
||B′yz|| =
∑
x
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λxk =
bδnc∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
λn−k0 λ
k
1,
where λ1 = 1− λ0. Finally, since we know that
||〈Πθc〉|| = max
y,z
||Byz|| ≤ max
y,z
||B′yz||,
we obtain the security guarantee of the form
ε =
bδnc∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
λn−k0 λ
k
1.
For δ = 0 there is only one term in the sum while for 0 < δ < λ1 we use the Chernoff
bound (Lemma 2.2) to obtain the final result of the lemma.
The protocol is secure as long as δ < λ1, which combined with Eq. (5.3) implies
that correctness and security is possible as long as
err < λ1.
This allows us to check whether a particular experimental setup (characterised by
err and λ1) allows for a secure implementation of the protocol. For example, if the
source emits perfect BB84 states (or, in fact, any two mutually unbiased bases on a
qubit) we can tolerate up to 14.6% of errors.
5.2 Modelling imperfect devices
While we have allowed our states to be imperfect and undergo some noise process in
transit, we have implicitly assumed that every time Bob0 pushes a button a qubit
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in a well-defined state is sent towards Alice0, who always detects it to obtain a
particular classical outcome. As of today there is no physical system which matches
this idealised description to a reasonable degree. Therefore, in collaboration with an
experimental group at the University of Geneva, we have developed a new version
of the protocol, which can be implemented using currently available devices.
First of all, instead of a single-photon source we use a weak-coherent source with
phase randomisation4, which emits pulses of light in which the number of photons
is a Poisson-distributed random variable. Let |r〉 be the Fock state of r photons
and µ be the average number of photons per pulse (an adjustable parameter of the
source). Then, the ensemble emitted by a weak-coherent source can be written as
ρ =
∞∑
r=0
pr|r〉〈r | for pr = e−µ · µ
r
r!
.
A direct consequence of this model is that some pulses might contain more than
one photon and we refer to those as multiphoton emissions. Such pulses consti-
tute a deadly threat to our protocol since Alice0 could measure the first photon
in the computational basis, the second photon in the Hadamard basis and, hence,
obtain enough information to open either value with certainty. Clearly, multipho-
ton emissions do not contribute to security and so their number must be rigorously
controlled.
Besides the imperfections of the source, there is also a certain probability that
a photon might be lost either in transit or during the detection process. Let η be
the detection efficiency, i.e. the probability that a photon sent by Bob0 is detected
by Alice0. We assume that the loss process affects every photon independently so
the number of photons detected by Alice0 is, again, a Poisson-distributed random
variable. The probability of detecting r photons equals
pr(µ, η) = e
−µη · (µη)
r
r!
. (5.10)
We assume that the detection efficiency depends neither on the measurement setting
nor on the incoming state. Note that while this is a natural assumption from the
theoretical point of view, it does not always hold for an experimental setup (it is
common to have slightly different detection efficiencies for measurements in different
bases) and this issue needs to be addressed while analysing experimental data as
explained in Section 5.4. Moreover, it has recently been demonstrated that strong
pulses of light might allow Bob to learn some information about Alice’s basis setting
4We have decided to use phase randomisation because then the number of photons in a pulse
can be modelled as a classical random variable, which turns out to be convenient for the security
analysis.
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[LWW+10], which is not included in our analysis.
We follow the standard approach (presented in Section 2.4), i.e. we assume that
the devices used by the honest party are trusted (their characterisation including
any imperfections is known) but the dishonest party is limited only by the laws
of physics. The following table lists the models used for each of the three distinct
scenarios.
Alice Bob source losses errors
honest honest weak-coherent source yes yes
honest dishonest perfect detectors only N/A
dishonest honest weak-coherent source no no
5.3 Protocol with backreporting
If we try to implement the original protocol using the equipment described above,
we run into a very simple problem: in most rounds Alice0 simply does not see a click
(either because the photon was never emitted or it was not detected). What is she
supposed to do then? One solution would be to simply generate a random bit and
act as if this was the outcome of the measurement. This solution works as long as
losses are infrequent and can be “hidden” within the error threshold. However, in
the experimental setup described above losses are extremely common. In fact, it is
the detection events that are rare. Therefore, flipping a coin for every loss is not a
feasible solution.
We solve this problem using a standard technique known as backreporting, which
requires Alice0 to inform Bob0 at the end of the quantum exchange which rounds
were successful (i.e. a photon was detected) and only these rounds are used for
the protocol (all the remaining data is discarded). This clearly restores correctness
but, unfortunately, it opens a new security loophole as dishonest Alice0 might also
backreport single-photon rounds in order to increase the contribution of multiphoton
emissions, which she can win with certainty. To avoid this threat Bob0 must carefully
monitor the number of rounds backreported by Alice. LetM be the set of rounds in
which Alice0 observed a click, which we call the valid set. Bob0 only continues with
the protocol if the size of the valid set exceeds a certain threshold, m := |M| ≥ γn,
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is an adjustable parameter of the protocol called the detection
threshold.
Protocol 8: Bit commitment by transmitting measurement outcomes
with backreporting
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1. (commit) At t = 0, Bob0 chooses x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random,
creates |xθ〉 and sends it to Alice0. Alice0 measures all the incoming qubits
in the same basis (computational if d = 0 and Hadamard if d = 1) . The
rounds in which a click was observed form M and y ∈ {0, 1}m is the
string of outcomes. Alice0 announcesM to Bob0. Bob0 continues with the
protocol only if m ≥ γn.
2. (open) At t = 1, Alice1 and Alice2 simultaneously send d and y to Bob1
and Bob2, respectively.
3. (verify) Bob1 and Bob2 pass all the information to Bob0, who verifies that:
• Alice1 and Alice2 have attempted to unveil the same value
• Alice1 and Alice2 have provided exactly the same string y
• the string y is consistent with the BB84 states initially prepared by
Bob0 up to the error threshold δ
dH(xS∩M, yS∩M) ≤ δ for d = 0,
dH(xT∩M, yT∩M) ≤ δ for d = 1.
If all three conditions are satisfied, Bob0 accepts the commitment.
5.3.1 Correctness
To guarantee correctness we must first ensure that Alice registers a sufficient number
of clicks. Asymptotically, we simply require that the probability of seeing a click
(i.e. detecting at least one photon) is larger than the detection threshold
∞∑
r=1
pr = 1− p0 > γ.
Using Eq. (5.10) to express p0 in terms of µ and η gives
e−µη + γ < 1.
Since in our model errors are independent of losses or multiphoton emissions, the
second correctness condition remains the same as before, i.e. Eq. (5.3).
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5.3.2 Security for honest Alice
Since backreporting introduces communication from Alice0 to Bob0 in the commit
phase, security for honest Alice is no longer unconditionally true. To make sure that
the valid setM does not contain any information about the commitment we must
ensure that the detection efficiencies do not depend on the basis choice regardless
of the state that the dishonest Bob0 sends in. We assume that the detection system
used by Alice satisfies these properties (see Section 5.2).
5.3.3 Security for honest Bob
Security analysis for honest Bob is an extension built on top of the previous ar-
gument. We take advantage of the fact that all the experimental imperfections
(e.g. multiphoton emissions or no-detection events) can be modelled as classical ran-
dom variables and that for particular values of these random variables Proposition
5.1 provides an explicit security bound.
In every round a certain number of photons (between 0 and∞) is emitted (recall
that in this case we assume that Alice0 has perfect detectors, i.e. η = 0). Pulses
with no photons affect correctness but do not constitute a security threat. Pulses
with one photon is what the original protocol calls for and what we analysed in the
previous section. Finally, multiphoton pulses are a serious threat as they allow Alice0
to obtain sufficient information to successfully open both values of the commitment.
To simplify our analysis we replace all the zero-photon emissions by single-photon
emissions (which only gives Alice more power). Eq. (5.10) with η = 0 implies that
the probability of a multiphoton emission in a particular round equals
pm = 1− e−µ(1 + µ).
The number of multiphoton rounds Nm is a binomially-distributed random variable
Pr[Nm = k] =
(
n
k
)
pkm(1− pm)n−k. (5.11)
The optimal strategy of dishonest Alice0 is to discard as many single-photon rounds
as possible. It is clear that if she can discard all of them, she is left with multiphoton
emissions only and no security can be guaranteed. Therefore, the necessary condition
for security is that the number of multiphoton rounds is lower than the detection
threshold
Nm < dγne.
After using up the entire backreporting allowance the number of valid rounds equals
m = dγne but there are only dγne −Nm (which is now guaranteed to be a positive
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number) single-photon rounds among them. Honest Bob believes that they are
performing a bit commitment protocol of dγne rounds but there is a certain number
of multiphoton ones, which Alice can win “for free”. Hence, she can concentrate
her error allowance on the single-photon rounds and the security we achieve is that
of playing a game of dγne − Nm rounds with the absolute (non-fractional) error
allowance of δdγne, which gives the effective (fractional) error allowance of
δ′ =
δdγne
dγne −Nm . (5.12)
The proof in Section 5.1.3 is valid only if the effective (fractional) error allowance,
δ′, satisfies
δ′ < λ1,
where λ1 measures the incompatibility of the measurements performed by Bob0.
Hence, in our case we require
δdγne < (dγne −Nm)λ1. (5.13)
In the asymptotic limit it is sufficient to look at the expectation value
E[Nm] = pmn = [1− e−µ(1 + µ)]n,
which substituted into Eq. (5.13) gives
e−µ(1 + µ) + (1− δ/λ1)γ > 1.
5.3.4 Requirements on the honest devices
Having derived explicit criteria for correctness and security we can check whether a
given experimental setup allows for a secure implementation of the protocol. The
correctness and security constraints are
e−µη + γ < 1,
err < δ,
e−µ(1 + µ) + (1− δ/λ1)γ > 1.
It is clear that δ and γ (parameters of the protocol) can be taken arbitrarily close
to the values which would turn the first two conditions into equalities. This leaves
us with only one, but rather complicated, condition
e−µ(1 + µ) + (1− err /λ1)(1− e−µη) > 1.
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This expression allows us to check whether for devices of certain quality (quantified
by λ1, err and η) there exists a value of µ that makes the protocol both correct and
secure.5
5.3.5 Explicit security calculation
The asymptotic analysis is relevant as n → ∞ but in any practical scenario the
number of rounds is finite. Therefore, we want to explicitly calculate security guar-
antees as a function of n. Since correctness is verified experimentally and security
for honest Alice is perfect by assumption, we only need to calculate security for
honest Bob.
Let E denote the event that Alice successfully cheats in the bit commitment
protocol. We have shown in Eq. (5.12) that the probability of cheating successfully
depends on the number of multiphoton emissions. Therefore, let us write
Pr[E] =
n∑
k=0
Pr[E|Nm = k] Pr[Nm = k]. (5.14)
Equation (5.5) allows us to bound Pr[E|Nm = k] as long as the number of multi-
photon emissions is below the threshold. For k < kt := γn(1− δ/λ1) we have
Pr[E|Nm = k] ≤ exp
(
− 1
2
(√
(γn− k)λ1 − δγn√
(γn− k)λ1
)2)
.
On the other hand, for k ≥ kt there is no security and the trivial bound, Pr[E|Nm =
k] ≤ 1, is the best we can hope for. The second term is given by Eq. (5.11).
Performing the summation (5.14) for any particular values of the parameters is
a straightforward exercise in any package for numerical calculations (e.g. Octave
[EBH09]).
5.4 Experimental implementation
Protocol 8 requires the use of three equidistant locations on a line. This is clearly
quite difficult to do if we want to take maximal advantage of the size of the Earth.
Therefore, we have implemented a modified protocol, in which only two locations
are used. The experiment is performed between Geneva (Location 1) and Singapore
(Location 2) and achieves secure commitment for 15.6 ms (the maximal duration
achievable on the Earth, corresponding to antipodal locations on the surface, equals
5Note that changing the mean photon number µ affects the physical aspect of the protocol so
it might influence other physical parameters like the error rate. On the other hand, parameters
like δ or γ, which are only relevant for the post-processing, do not have such an effect.
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t = 0
t
t = 2
Alice1 Bob1
t = 1
Alice0 (?)
Alice1 Bob1 Alice2 Bob2
Fig. 5.2: Spacetime diagram for the experimental implementation of Protocol 8.
The red dot represents the commit phase while the blue dots represent the open
phase. The shaded area corresponds to the past light cones of the events of the
open phase. The green dot determines the commitment point, i.e. the latest point
at which Alice can still perform an honest commitment.
21.2 ms). As explained in Section 5.1 the maximal commitment time equals half
the time it takes to travel at lightspeed between the two opening locations (we
cannot rule out the possibility that dishonest Alice deployed an extra agent exactly
in between the two locations, who receives the quantum states at t = 1 and only
then performs the measurements, cf. Fig. 5.2).
Each location hosts one agent for each player synchronised to universal time us-
ing a global positioning system (GPS) clocks. The protocol consists of two parts:
(i) exchange of quantum information in the commit phase and (ii) exchange of
classical information in the open phase. Phase (i) was implemented using a com-
mercial quantum key distribution system Vectis 5100 from ID Quantique located
at the University of Geneva (see Fig. 5.3). This system is based on the two-way
“Plug&Play” configuration [MHH+97]: strong optical pulses travel from Alice1 to
Bob1, who uses them to encode the BB84 states. Moreover, he attenuates the op-
tical power down to single photon level and sends these weak-coherent pulses back
to Alice1. Trojan-horse attacks on Bob’s side are particularly effective against the
“Plug&Play” configuration so the power of the incoming beam is continuously mon-
itored by Bob1. To use the quantum key distribution system for bit commitment
some software changes must be made, in particular communication from Alice1 to
Bob1 is restricted to backreporting only. As discussed in Section 5.3.2 extra care
has to be taken to ensure that the backreported data does not leak any information
about the choice of measurements performed by Alice1. In our experimental setup
the two bases exhibit slightly different detection probabilities so the raw data must
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clockAntenna
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to Alice2
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to Bob2
Singapore
Fig. 5.3: Experimental setup located in Geneva. The setup located in Singapore is
identical except that Alice1 and Bob1 are replaced by Alice2 and Bob2, and that there
is no quantum key distribution system (the protocol only requires quantum inter-
actions in the commit phase which as explained in Section 5.4 happens in Geneva).
Figure reproduced with permission from Tommaso Lunghi.
be artificially “equalised”.6
The duration of the commitment is ultimately limited by the distance between
the locations under the assumption that all local communication is instantaneous.
However, since the exchange of quantum states in the commit phase takes a con-
siderate amount of time, which would reduce the achievable commitment time, we
have performed a delayed commitment. In a delayed commitment scheme Alice1 first
commits to a random bit r and only later announces d⊕r, which initiates the actual
commitment (and determines its value). This allows us to perform all the quantum
information exchange in advance, which maximises the commitment time.
Classical information needed by Alice2 in Singapore to open the commitment
was transmitted in advance through the internet (one-time-pad encrypted using
pre-shared keys generated by a quantum random generator from ID Quantique).
The classical information exchange in the open phase was performed using stand-
alone computers equipped with field-programmable gate array (FPGA) to make the
transmission time negligible relative to the commitment time (around 3 µs).
6More specifically, with probability p we discard an outcome obtained for the more efficient
setting, where p is chosen to make the expected number of detections backreported for both
settings equal.
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Chapter 6
Multiround relativistic bit
commitment protocol
This chapter is based on
• Practical relativistic bit commitment [arXiv:1411.4917]
T. Lunghi, J. Kaniewski, F. Bussières, R. Houlmann, M. Tomamichel, S.
Wehner and H. Zbinden
Physical Review Letters 115, 030502 (2015).
(presented at QCrypt ’14)
The quantum protocol discussed in the previous chapter implements secure bit com-
mitment in the β-split model (one of the minimal splits, in which, as discussed in
Section 3.3, no classical protocol can give security). This demonstrates that quan-
tum protocols are strictly more powerful and in this particular case the extra power
results from the no-cloning theorem. However, a weak point of that scheme is the
length of the commitment, which is limited by the spatial separation of the two
opening sites. In particular, for a protocol taking place on the Earth, the commit-
ment time is limited to 21 ms. While this might be sufficient for some purposes,
extending the commitment time would be highly desirable. It is clear that if the
spatial arrangement is fixed, the only manner to extend the commitment time is
to introduce additional rounds of communication. In fact, this idea was proposed
by Kent quite early on [Ken99, Ken05], where instead of opening the commitment
Alice commits to the information she would have used in the unveiling. The original
way of “chaining” commitments has the drawback that the communication required
grows exponentially with the number of rounds [Ken99]. This was later rectified
by adding a compression scheme on top of the protocol [Ken05]. Security of such
a chained scheme would follow directly if the individual commitments were com-
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posably secure1. However, we do not know how to prove composable security of
relativistic commitment schemes and there is evidence that this might indeed be
impossible (e.g. in Appendix A we show that the classical relativistic sBGKW scheme
is not secure according to the usual composable definition). Therefore, the security
proof must explicitly consider all the intermediate commitments. Security argument
against classical adversaries presented by Kent [Ken05] is of asymptotic nature and,
therefore, not sufficient for implementation purposes.
Outline: With the goal of finding a new classical multiround protocol in mind
we first revisit the two-round protocol proposed in Ref. [Sim07, CSST11] and show
that security for honest Bob relies on the difficulty of a certain non-local game,
whose quantum value was recently investigated by Sikora, Chailloux and Kerenidis
[SCK14]. This completes the security analysis and shows that the two-round pro-
tocol is secure against quantum adversaries.2 With the two-round scheme as our
starting point we propose a new classical multiround protocol (with constant com-
munication rate) and analyse its security against classical adversaries.3 Correctness
can be verified by inspection, security for honest Alice is intuitively obvious (never-
theless formalising it requires some work) and security for honest Bob turns out to
be more involved but we eventually derive an explicit and easily computable secu-
rity bound. Unfortunately, the bound suffers from rather undesirable scaling in the
number of rounds (which is proportional to the length of the commitment). While
the commitment time is not subject to any fundamental limitations, an implemen-
tation using standard digital equipment only allows modest commitment times. In
collaboration with the Geneva group we have implemented the protocol to achieve
a secure commitment of 2 ms.4
Note added: After the completion of this work, two groups independently provided
security proofs that give significantly improved security bounds [FF15b, CCL15].
These results imply that Protocol 9 can be used to realise long-lasting commitments
with very modest resources, hence, making it truly practical.
1In fact, this is exactly the idea of composable security: the protocol is indistinguishable from
the ideal primitive in all possible scenarios.
2Security for honest Alice is obvious against classical Bob. Security against quantum Bob
follows from a simple observation that if only one agent (Bob1) is involved in the commit phase
of a classical protocol, no advantage can be gained by using quantum systems (cf. footnote 12 in
Section 4.2.2).
3For more than two rounds security analysis against quantum adversaries becomes rather in-
volved as explained in Section 4.2.2.
4An attentive reader might be puzzled that the new multiround protocol yields commitment
time which is significantly shorter than the one previously achieved by the quantum protocol. The
solution of this conundrum is that while the previous experiment was performed between Geneva
and Singapore, the new multiround one was (for practical reasons) executed between two locations
within Switzerland. Performing the multiround protocol between Geneva and Singapore would
give a commitment time of 156 ms (a tenfold improvement over the quantum protocol).
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6.1 Two-round protocol
Since the two-round protocol has already been discussed in Section 4.1 let us go
directly to the security analysis. Recall that the protocol requires two sites labelled
Location 1 and Location 2. To simplify notation in this chapter we assume that
these locations are separated by (1 + ) units of length for some  > 0. Therefore,
one unit of time is not sufficient to transmit information between them.
Protocol 6: Simplified-BGKW (relativistic)
1. (commit) At t = 0, Bob1 sends y1 = b to Alice1 and she replies with
x1 = d · y1 ⊕ a. Bob1 immediately sends x1 to Bob2.
2. (open) At t = 1, Alice2 reveals x2 = a to Bob2.
3. (verify) At t = 1 + , Bob2 receives x1 and verifies that x1 ⊕ x2 = d · b.
(Note that the verification step could be performed slightly earlier using an agent po-
sitioned somewhere in between Bob1 and Bob2 but since ε is chosen to be essentially
0 this makes no difference.)
Correctness is straightforward to check and security for honest Alice comes from
the fact that the message that Bob1 receives in the commit phase is one-time-padded
with a uniformly random string.
Security for honest Bob is quantified using Definition 3.2. Since only one agent
(Alice2) is involved in the open phase, the distinction between local and global
command does not arise. As explained in Section 2.5.1 it is often helpful to explicitly
state the cheating game that Alice attempts to win. In the commit phase Alice1
receives b ∈ {0, 1}n (chosen uniformly at random) and in the open phase Alice2
receives nothing from Bob but she is challenged to open d ∈ {0, 1} chosen uniformly
at random. In each phase she is required to output an n-bit string, which we denote
by x1 and x2, respectively. Since there is no communication between Alice1 and
Alice2 this is equivalent to a two-player game which (using the formalism presented
in Section 2.3) is specified by the uniform input distribution p(b, d) = 1
2
· 1
2n
and the
predicate function
V (b, x1, d, x2) =
1 if x1 ⊕ x2 = d · b,0 otherwise.
Since this game can be seen as a generalisation of the CHSH game (which corre-
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sponds to n = 1), let us call it CHSHn after Ref. [SCK14]. Calculating the classical
value is straightforward but let us do it explicitly for completeness.
As explained in Section 2.3 we might without loss of generality assume that Alice1
and Alice2 employ deterministic strategies, which we denote by functions f1(b) and
f2(d). Define Hd as the event over B (private randomness of Bob) that the opening
of d is accepted
Hd ⇐⇒ d ·B = f1(B)⊕ f2(d). (6.1)
Since both H0 and H1 are defined over B it is meaningful to talk about H0∨H1 and
H0∧H1.5 Note that Pr[H0]+Pr[H1] = Pr[H0∨H1]+Pr[H0∧H1] ≤ 1+Pr[H0∧H1].
The event H0 ∧ H1 happens when condition (6.1) is satisfied for both values of d.
Define K to be the event that the XOR of the two is satisfied
K ⇐⇒ B = f2(0)⊕ f2(1).
Since the left-hand side is a uniformly distributed random variable and the right-
hand side is a constant Pr[K] = 2−n. Moreover, as H0 ∧ H1 =⇒ K we have
Pr[H0 ∧H1] ≤ Pr[K]. Combining the two statements implies that for any strategy
of classical Alice we have Pr[H0] + Pr[H1] ≤ 1 + 2−n which leads to
ω(CHSHn) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n+1
.
It is easy to check that the trivial strategy of always outputting x1 = x2 = 0n
saturates this bound. Intuitively this game should be difficult because unveiling
d = 0 and d = 1 requires Alice2 to know x1 and x1 ⊕ b, respectively. She cannot
guess both of these too well since b is chosen uniformly at random by Bob1.
Applying this reasoning to quantum adversaries is not so straightforward because
Alice2 might have two distinct measurements that reveal x1 and x1⊕ b, respectively,
but they might be incompatible so the implications on her ability to guess b are not
so obvious. Fortunately, the following bound on the quantum value was recently
proven [SCK14]
ω∗(CHSHn) ≤ 1
2
+
1√
2n+1
.
This is sufficient for our purposes as it implies that
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 +
√
2 · 2−n/2
for all strategies of dishonest quantum Alice. Therefore, the protocol is ε-binding
with ε = 2(1−n)/2 decaying exponentially in n (but note that the decay rate is half
5This is exactly where the argument breaks down when applied to the quantum world, in which
H0 and H1 are not in general defined simultaneously.
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of the decay rate against classical adversaries).
This is a prime example that analysing classical protocols against quantum ad-
versaries is not always a futile task and sometimes leads to interesting observations.
An immediate question arises regarding super-quantum adversaries: what if Alice1
and Alice2 have access to stronger-than-quantum correlations? It is straightforward
to see that the protocol is completely insecure against Alice1 and Alice2 who have
access to no-signalling correlations [Sim07, CSST11]. In fact, it was shown recently
that in this particular model it is not possible to have a protocol secure against
no-signalling adversaries [FF15a]. This is a consequence of the fact that in this
context the hiding property coincides with the definition of no-signalling and so if
the protocol is hiding then there exists a perfect cheating strategy consistent with
no-signalling. This is yet another example of how classical and quantum theories
are qualitatively different from the no-signalling world.
6.2 Multiround protocol
To extend the commitment time we must introduce additional rounds of communi-
cation, which keep the commitment “alive” (the sustain phase). If Alice and Bob
require the commitment to be valid for m units of time (for some m ∈ N) they need
to execute the following protocol of m+ 1 rounds. We use k as a label for the round
under consideration and since the rounds alternate between the two locations we
define
l(k) =
1 if k ≡ 1 (mod 2),2 if k ≡ 0 (mod 2).
We use ak and bk to denote private strings (chosen uniformly at random) of Alice and
Bob, respectively and xk and yk to denote messages announced by Alice and Bob,
respectively, in the kth round of the protocol. All the n-bit strings are interpreted
as elements of the finite field F2n and “∗” denotes the finite field multiplication.
Protocol 9: Multiround bit commitment
1. (commit, k = 1) At t = 0, Bob1 sends y1 = b1 to Alice1. Alice1 returns
x1 = d · y1 ⊕ a1.
2. (sustain, 2 ≤ k ≤ m) At t = k − 1, Bobl(k) sends yk = bk to Alicel(k).
Alicel(k) returns xk = (yk ∗ ak−1)⊕ ak.
3. (open, k = m + 1) At t = m, Alicel(m+1) sends d and xm+1 = am to
Bobl(m+1).
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4. (verify) At t = m+ , Bobl(m+1) receives xm and accepts the opening if
xm+1 = xm ⊕ bm ∗ xm−1 ⊕ bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ xm−2 ⊕ . . .
. . . ⊕ bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗ b2 ∗ x1 ⊕ d · bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗ b1.
(6.2)
It is easy to see that the timing is chosen precisely to make every two consecutive
rounds space-like separated. In the formalism presented in Section 4.2 there are
m+ 1 interactions and the communication graph is
G = ([m+ 1], E) for
E = {(j, k) ∈ [m+ 1]2 : j + 2 ≤ k}.
(6.3)
Correctness of the protocol is straightforward to check by substituting the honest
responses of Alice1 and Alice2 into the acceptance condition (6.2).
6.2.1 Security for honest Alice
Security for honest Alice is a direct consequence of the fact that every message
she announces is one-time-padded with a fresh secret n-bit string. Hence, we would
intuitively expect the transcripts corresponding to d = 0 and d = 1 to be statistically
indistinguishable. We prove this statement by considering an arbitrary adaptive
attack (consistent with relativity) that classical Bob1 and Bob2 might implement.
While we do not believe that Bob1 and Bob2 can gain anything by using quantum
systems, we currently do not have a rigorous argument to justify this belief.
We start with a lemma which formalises the intuition that if we take an arbitrary
random variable taking values in Fq and add it to a uniform and uncorrelated random
variable (over Fq) then there will be no correlations between the input and the output
(or any function thereof). More specifically, in the following lemma Y is a random
variable from which the input is generated using function g, X is the fresh (finite
field) randomness and h is a function allowing us to condition on a certain subset
of values of Y .
Lemma 6.1. Let X = Fq and Y ,Z be arbitrary finite sets. Let X and Y be two
random variables taking values in X and Y , respectively, such that X is uniform
and independent from Y
Pr[X = x, Y = y] = q−1 · Pr[Y = y], (6.4)
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Then for arbitrary functions g : Y → X , h : Y → Z and
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arbitrary fixed x ∈ X , z ∈ Z it holds that
Pr[X + g(Y ) = x |h(Y ) = z] = q−1.
Proof. Note that
Pr[X + g(Y ) = x, h(Y ) = z] =
∑
y∈Y
Pr[X = x− g(y), h(y) = z, Y = y]
=
∑
y∈Y
h(y)=z
Pr[X = x− g(y), Y = y] =
∑
y∈Y
h(y)=z
q−1 · Pr[Y = y] = q−1 · Pr[h(Y ) = z],
where the second last equality follows from applying the assumption (6.4) to every
term of the sum.
Lemma 6.1 allows us to prove security for honest Alice.
Proposition 6.1. If Alice is honest then the protocol is hiding.
Proof. We want to show that the transcripts for d = 0 and d = 1 at the opening
point (i.e. after the last sustain round) are indistinguishable, i.e.
Pr[X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xm = xm|d = 0] = Pr[X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xm = xm|d = 1]
for all x1, x2, . . . , xm. In fact, we show a stronger statement, namely
Pr[X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xt = xt|d = c] = 2−nt, (6.5)
for all t ∈ [m] and both values of c ∈ {0, 1}.
Honest Alice follows the protocol, which means that {Ak}mk=1 are drawn indepen-
dently, uniformly at random from {0, 1}n and so Alice’s message in the kth round
(represented as a random variable) equals
Xk =
d · Y1 ⊕ A1 for k = 1,(Yk ∗ Ak−1)⊕ Ak for 2 ≤ k ≤ m. (6.6)
Bob1 and Bob2, on the other hand, are only limited by the causal constraints,
which means that the message in the kth round might depend on some pre-shared
randomness denoted by RB and all the responses of Alice1 and Alice2 which belong
to the past of the kth round. Therefore, without loss of generality the message in
the kth round is
Yk = fk(RB, X1, X2, . . . Xk−2) (6.7)
for some arbitrary function fk (we include all randomness used by Bob in RB so fk
is deterministic).
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In this scenario the full transcript is a deterministic function of Alice’s commit-
ment d, her private randomness {Ak}mk=1 and Bob’s pre-shared randomness RB. For
every string announced by Alice and Bob we can explicitly find the subset of random
variables it may depend on as listed in the table below
message random variables it might depend on
Y1 RB
Y2 RB
Y3 d,RB, A1
...
...
Yk d,RB, A1, A2, . . . , Ak−2
...
...
Ym d,RB, A1, A2, . . . , Am−2
X1 d,RB, A1
X2 d,RB, A1, A2
X3 d,RB, A1, A2, A3
...
...
Xk d,RB, A1, A2, . . . , Ak
...
...
Xm d,RB, A1, A2, . . . , Am
First, we verify that condition (6.5) holds for t = 1
Pr[X1 = x1|d = c] = Pr[b · Y1 ⊕ A1 = x1] = Pr[b · f1(RB)⊕ A1 = x1] = 2−n,
where the first two equalities follow from Eqs. (6.6) and (6.7), respectively. The last
equality is a direct consequence of Lemma 6.1 (in a simplified form: no conditioning)
applied to X = A1, Y = (c, RB), g(Y ) = c · f1(RB). Now, suppose that Eq. (6.5)
holds for t = k. Then
Pr[X1 = x1, . . . , Xk+1 = xk+1|d = c]
= Pr[Xk+1 = xk+1|d = c,X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk] · Pr[X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk|d = c]
= Pr[(Yk+1 ∗ Ak)⊕ Ak+1 = xk+1|d = b,X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk] · 2−nk
= 2−n · 2−nk = 2−(n+1)k,
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where the second last inequality follows from applying Lemma 6.1 to
X = Ak+1,
Y = (c, RB, A1, . . . , Ak),
g(Y ) = Yk+1 ∗ Ak, (6.8)
h(Y ) = (X1, X2, . . . , Xk).
Note that it is not immediately obvious and the reader should verify (using the table
presented above) that the quantities on the right-hand side of Eq. (6.8) are functions
of Y alone, and therefore satisfy the assumptions of the lemma. This shows that
Eq. (6.5) holds for t = k + 1 and so by induction it must hold for all t ∈ [m]. This
shows that even at the opening point the transcript contains no information about
Alice’s commitment, which implies that the protocol is hiding.
6.2.2 Security for honest Bob
Security for honest Bob is where the framework developed in Section 4.2 comes in
useful. We immediately identify the case of honest Bob as a game of m+ 1 players
P1, . . . ,Pm+1 whose communication is restricted by G defined in Eq. (6.3). Player
Pk (for 1 ≤ k ≤ m) receives a uniformly random n-bit string represented by the
random variable Bk. Moreover, all the players except for P1 receive d (the value
they are challenged to unveil) chosen uniformly at random. It is clear that d must
not be available to P1 (this would correspond to an honest commitment) but it must
be available to all the other players. This is important as it fixes the commitment
point to occur immediately after t = 0, i.e. allows us to claim that Alice becomes
committed immediately after the first round.
Having explicitly determined the inputs received by each player and the com-
munication constraints we apply Observation 4.1 to turn this scenario into a non-
communicating game. It is easy to verify that the output of P1 denoted by X1 can
be written as
X1 = f1(RA, B1),
where RA corresponds to any randomness shared by the players. For Pk for 2 ≤ k ≤
m we have
Xk = fk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk, d).
Finally, for Pm+1 we have
Xm+1 = fm+1(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bm−1, d).
This allows us to prove security for honest Bob.
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Proposition 6.2. If Bob is honest then the protocol is ε-binding for ε = ωm defined
in Eq. (2.4).
Proof. The argument is essentially identical to the one presented in Section 6.1 and
we use the same definitions for the events H0, H1 and K. Since K is defined as the
XOR of Eq. (6.2) for d = 0 and d = 1 we have
K ⇐⇒ B1 ∗B2 ∗ . . . ∗Bm = gm+1(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bm−1)⊕ gm(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bm−2, Bm)
m−1⊕
k=2
Bm ∗Bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗Bk+1 ∗ gk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk),
where
gk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk) = fk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk, d = 0)
⊕ fk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk, d = 1).
To bound Pr[K] note that the right-hand side contains exactly m terms, but each of
them depends on (m− 1) B’s; none of the terms depends on all B’s simultaneously.
The terms corresponding to 2 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 have some internal structure (e.g. the
dependence on Bm is not arbitrary) but we can relax the problem to the case where
the kth term is an arbitrary function of all the B’s except for Bk denoted by hk. The
winning condition for the relaxed game is
B1 ∗B2 ∗ . . . ∗Bm =
m⊕
k=1
hk(B[m]\{k}).
In Section 2.3.3 we define the optimal winning probability for this game to be ωm,
which concludes the proof since
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + Pr[K] ≤ 1 + ωm.
The recursive argument presented in Section 2.3.5 allows us to obtain explicit
upper bounds on ωm. In particular, we have ωm ≤ cm, where
cm =
2−n for m = 1,1
2n+1
+
√
cm−1 for m ≥ 2.
(6.9)
For large n, to a good approximation we have cm ≈ 2−n/2m . The decay is exponential
in n but since the decay rate strongly depends on m, security deteriorates rapidly as
we increase the number of rounds. The tightness of these bounds is an interesting
open problem and is briefly discussed in Appendix B.5 of Ref. [LKB+15]. No explicit
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GPS-Driver
Internet
Antenna
Fig. 6.1: Experimental setup at Location 1 where A1 and B1 represent Alice1 and
Bob1, respectively. Figure reproduced with permission from Tommaso Lunghi.
cheating strategy is known, whose winning probability would approach our security
bounds.
6.3 Experimental implementation
Both the two-round and the multiround protocols have been implemented between
University of Geneva and University of Berne. The straight-line distance between
these two locations is s = 131 km, which corresponds to ∆t = 437µs. Each classical
agent consists of a standalone computer equipped with a FPGA and the agents are
connected by an optical link (see Fig. 6.1). Synchronisation to universal time is
achieved via a GPS clock. While the task of exchanging classical information is on
its own quite straightforward, the challenge in our case is to take maximal advantage
of the relativistic constraints. To maximise the commitment time, it is crucial to
ensure that the devices are synchronised up to high accuracy and that classical data
manipulation (communication with an external memory to load and store data, data
exchange between the two agents and local computation) are optimised to produce
the highest feasible rate.
The protocol was implemented with n = 512 bits, which for the two-round
protocol gives the security parameter of ε ≈ 10−77 (against quantum adversaries).
The multiround protocol was implemented with m + 1 = 6 rounds which gives the
security parameter of ε ≈ 2.3 × 10−10 (against classical adversaries). The total
commitment time was 2 ms but placing exactly the same setup at the antipodes of
the Earth would allow for commitment time of 212 ms. Of course, the commitment
time could be made longer by employing more sophisticated hardware, which allows
us to exchange more data within the relativistic constraints, but since our main goal
was to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing multiround schemes we decided
not to do it.
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Conclusions
The central theme of this thesis is the study of how communication constraints can be
used in classical and quantum cryptography, with a particular focus on commitment
schemes. Communication constraints resulting from fundamental physical principles
(like the fact that the speed of light is finite) are of particular interest. While
relativity does not permit to implement the ideal commitment functionality, some
weaker variants are possible and understanding similarities and differences between
these schemes lies at the heart of this thesis.
It seems fair to claim that we now have a good understanding of relativistic
commitment schemes, in particular the simplest class, in which no messages are
exchanged when the commitment is valid. The main drawback of such schemes
is the limitation on the commitment time, which is proportional to the distance
between the agents. In order to increase the length of the commitment (without
moving the agents further apart) one needs to resort to multiround schemes and
we have presented a particular classical protocol along with a security proof against
classical adversaries. This shows that in the classical world one can achieve arbitrary
long commitments even if the agents are forced to occupy a finite region of space.
A natural follow-up question is to ask whether this statement remains true in
the quantum world. Security analysis of the aforementioned multiround protocol
against quantum adversaries is currently out of reach but we conjecture that the
protocol remains secure against quantum adversaries (although with weaker security
guarantees). Moreover, security analysis of relativistic protocols against quantum
adversaries leads to a new, interesting class of problems: multiplayer games with
communication constraints, which have not been studied before (except for a few
special cases) and might be of independent interest. Note that multiround com-
mitment schemes against no-signalling adversaries have recently been shown to be
impossible [FF15a].
Having understood the features and limitations of relativistic commitment schemes,
the next step would be to look at more powerful primitives and oblivious transfer
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would be a natural choice. While we know that perfect oblivious transfer is not
possible, one might think of weaker variants which have not been ruled out. We
do not see a straightforward way of translating distributed oblivious transfer pro-
tocols into the relativistic setting (see Section 4.1 for details) and, to the best of
our knowledge, no explicitly relativistic schemes have been proposed. Investigating
the possibility of relativistic oblivious transfer would constitute an important step
towards characterising the exact power of quantum relativistic cryptography.
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Appendix A
Classical certification of relativistic
bit commitment
In 1992 Bennett et al. proposed how to construct oblivious transfer by combining
bit commitment with quantum communication [BBCS92]. This was later formalised
and proven secure by Yao [Yao95], who refers to it as “the canonical construction”.
At that point the quantum bit commitment protocol by Brassard et al. [BCJL93]
was considered secure so the canonical construction uses it as a black box. While
quantum bit commitment was later proven impossible, the canonical construction
remains interesting because classically we do not know whether bit commitment can
be used to implement oblivious transfer.
Attempts to use relativistic commitment schemes in the canonical construction
led to some interesting insight. It turns out that the construction implicitly assumes
a certain property of the commitment scheme known as classical certification, which
in the quantum world should not be taken for granted. In fact, Kent showed that
classical certification is generally impossible in case of quantum protocols [Ken12c].
In this appendix we show that classical certification is not determined solely by
the protocol but depends also on the exact power of the adversary. More specifically,
we show that the (classical relativistic) sBGKW scheme is classically-certifiable against
classical adversaries but not against quantum adversaries. We discuss why lack of
classical certification completely breaks the canonical construction and present an
explicit cheating strategy.
A.1 Classical certification of the sBGKW scheme
Classical certification should be thought of as a stronger variant of the binding
property and to make this connection clear we call it the strongly-binding property.
Since the goal here is to flesh out the difference between the two notions and we al-
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ready have a particular example in mind, we use definitions tailored to that concrete
scenario. For completeness, let us restate the protocol first.
Protocol 4: Simplified-BGKW
1. (commit) Bob sends y1 = b to Alice1 and she replies with x1 = d · y1 ⊕ a.
2. (open) Alice2 reveals x2 = a to Bob.
3. (verify) Bob verifies that x1 ⊕ x2 = d · b.
Note that no communication is required between the commitment point and the
opening point (so the two are operationally equivalent) and that only Alice2 is
involved in the open phase.
Definition A.1. Let σA1A2B be a state that Alice1 and Alice2 can enforce at the
commitment point and let (Φ0A2→P ,Φ
1
A2→P ) be opening maps performed by Alice2.
A multiagent bit commitment protocol is ε-binding if for all states and all maps
we have
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε,
where
pd = tr
(
Maccept
[
ΦdA2→P (σA2B)
])
.
A multiagent bit commitment protocol is ε-strongly-binding if every state
σA1A2B can be supplemented by a binary random variable D
σDA1A2B = |0〉〈0|D ⊗ σ0A1A2B + |1〉〈1|D ⊗ σ1A1A2B
such that the subnormalised states σdA1A2B satisfy
tr
(
Maccept
[
ΦdA2→P (σ
d
A2B
)
]) ≤ ε (A.1)
for d ∈ {0, 1}.
Intuitively, the random variable D tells us which value Alice2 cannot unveil. More
precisely, inequality (A.1) states that the probability of D = d and Bob accepting
the unveiling of d is at most ε. As the random variable D could be given to an
external observer, it captures the notion that the commitment has an objective
value, which is beyond Alice’s influence. It is a simple exercise to show that every
protocol which is ε-strongly-binding is also ε-binding.
In Chapter 6 we showed that Protocol 4 is ε-binding with
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ε = 2−n (against classical adversaries),
ε =
√
2 · 2−n/2 (against quantum adversaries).
While there is clearly a quantitative difference, qualitatively the situation is the
same: in both cases the protocol is secure and the security guarantee decays expo-
nentially in n.
The situation turns out to be quite different when we consider the stronger
definition. We start by showing that Protocol 4 is ε-strongly-binding with ε =
2−n/2 against classical adversaries. However, we then prove that against quantum
adversaries, the protocol does not satisfy the strongly-binding definition for any
ε < 1
4
regardless of how large n is.
To show that the protocol is strongly-binding in the classical case we explicitly
construct the random variable D. It suffices to provide a construction for determin-
istic strategies of Alice (any non-deterministic strategy can be written as a convex
combination of deterministic strategies). The deterministic strategy of Alice1 is a
function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, while for Alice2 we have g : {0, 1} → {0, 1}n, where
the argument of g is the value d that she is trying to unveil. Then, the condition
for successfully unveiling d becomes
f(b)⊕ g(d) = d · b.
Proposition A.1. Protocol 4 is ε-strongly-binding against classical adversaries
with ε = 2−n/2.
Proof. Under the assumption that Alice1 and Alice2 behave deterministically the
state of the protocol at the commitment point is completely described by two vari-
ables: b and f(b), which can be used to define the random variableD. For c ∈ {0, 1}n
let
S(c) := {b ∈ {0, 1}n : f(b) = c}
and
T0 := {c ∈ {0, 1}n : |S(c)| ≤ 2n/2},
T1 := {c ∈ {0, 1}n : |S(c)| > 2n/2}.
Note that |T1| < 2n/2 since
2n =
∑
c
|S(c)| ≥
∑
c∈T1
|S(c)| > 2n/2
∑
c∈T1
1 = 2n/2|T1|.
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We define the random variable D as a deterministic function of b
D :=
0 if f(b) ∈ T0,1 if f(b) ∈ T1.
Now we check that this definition satisfies the conditions. For D = 0 we have
Pr[D = 0 ∧ unveil 0] = Pr[D = 0 ∧ f(b)⊕ g(0) = 0n]
= 2−n|{b ∈ {0, 1}n : f(b) ∈ T0 ∧ f(b) = g(0)}|
= 2−n|{b ∈ {0, 1}n : g(0) ∈ T0 ∧ f(b) = g(0)}|
= 2−n
∣∣S(g(0))∣∣ · I[g(0) ∈ T0] ≤ 2−n2n/2 = 2−n/2,
where I[·] denotes the indicator function1. For D = 1 we have
Pr[D = 1 ∧ unveil 1] = Pr[D = 1 ∧ f(b)⊕ g(1) = b]
= 2−n|{b ∈ {0, 1}n : f(b) ∈ T1 ∧ f(b)⊕ g(1) = b}|
= 2−n
∑
c∈T1
|{b ∈ {0, 1}n : f(b) = c ∧ f(b)⊕ g(1) = b}|
≤ 2−n
∑
c∈T1
|{b ∈ {0, 1}n : c⊕ g(1) = b}|
≤ 2−n
∑
c∈T1
1 = 2−n|T1| < 2−n · 2n/2 = 2−n/2.
To prove that this stronger notion of security is not possible in the quantum
case, we propose an explicit attack and show that the resulting state cannot be
supplemented by an additional random variable satisfying the criteria.
Proposition A.2. Protocol 4 does not satisfy the ε-strongly-binding property
against quantum adversaries for any ε < 1
4
.
Proof. Suppose that at the beginning of the protocol Alice1 and Alice2 share the
maximally entangled state of 2n qubits
|Ψ2n〉A1A2 = 2−n/2
∑
x
|x〉A1|x〉A2 .
Let C be an auxiliary control register held by Alice1, initially prepared in the state
1The indicator function is defined to satisfy I[true statement] = 1 and I[false statement] = 0.
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|+〉 . When Alice1 receives b, she applies the following unitary U bA1C
U bA1C |x〉A1 |0〉C = |x〉A1|0〉C ,
U bA1C |x〉A1 |1〉C = |x⊕ b〉A1|1〉C .
(A.2)
Then, the tripartite state |ψ〉A1A2C becomes
|ψ〉A1A2C = (U bA1C ⊗ 1A2)|Ψ2n〉A1A2|+〉C
= 2−(n+1)/2
[∑
x
|x〉A1|x〉A2|0〉C +
∑
x
|x⊕ b〉A1 |x〉A2|1〉C
]
= 2−(n+1)/2
[∑
x
|x〉A1|x〉A2|0〉C +
∑
x
|x〉A1 |x⊕ b〉A2|1〉C
]
= 2−(n+1)/2
∑
x
|x〉A1
[
|x〉A2|0〉C + |x⊕ b〉A2|1〉C
]
.
Now, Alice1 measures A1 in the computational basis to obtain a classical random
variable X1 and it is easy to verify that the state σX1A2C is
σX1A2C = 2
−n∑
x
|x〉〈x|X1 ⊗ |αx,b〉〈αx,b |A2C ,
where
|αx,b〉A2C =
1√
2
(|x〉A2|0〉C + |x⊕ b〉A2|1〉C).
Recall that b is drawn uniformly at random by Bob and we should explicitly include
it in the state. The state σX1BA2C represents a complete description of the state of
the protocol at the commitment point
σX1BA2C = 2
−2n∑
x,b
|x〉〈x|X1 ⊗ |b〉〈b|B ⊗ |αx,b〉〈αx,b |A2C .
Our goal now is to show that regardless of how we define the auxiliary random
variable D, it will not meet the desired criteria. The most general form of the state
with the additional random variable is
σDX1BA2C =
∑
d,x,b
|d〉〈d|D ⊗ |x〉〈x|X1 ⊗ |b〉〈b|B ⊗ σdxbA2C ,
where σdxbA2C are subnormalised quantum states. However, since tracing out D must
give us back σX1BA2C and the states on A2C (conditional on particular values of X1
and B) are pure, we conclude that for all d, x, b
σdxbA2C ∝ |αx,b〉〈αx,b |A2C .
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Therefore, without loss of generality we can write
σDX1BA2C =
∑
d,x,b
pdxb|d〉〈d|D ⊗ |x〉〈x|X1 ⊗ |b〉〈b|B ⊗ |αx,b〉〈αx,b |A2C ,
where pdxb = Pr[D = d,X1 = x,B = b] is a probability distribution over D,X1 and
B. Now, we need to evaluate the probability of Alice2 unveiling the commitment
successfully. Since Alice1 does not play a role in the open phase, we trace out
subsystem C. The unveiling strategy of Alice2 is simply to measure her subsystem
in the computational basis (regardless of the value she is trying to unveil). If we
represent her measurement outcome by X2 we obtain the following (fully classical)
state
σDX1BX2 =
∑
d,x,b
pdxb|d〉〈d|D ⊗ |x〉〈x|X1 ⊗ |b〉〈b|B ⊗
1
2
(|x〉〈x|X2 + |x⊕ b〉〈x⊕ b|X2).
This allows us to evaluate the
Pr[D = d ∧ unveil d] = Pr[D = d ∧X1 ⊕X2 = d ·B]
=
∑
xb
pdxb
2
(
1 + I[b = 0]
)
≥ 1
2
∑
xb
pdxb =
1
2
Pr[D = d].
Since Pr[D = 0] + Pr[D = 1] = 1, we must have Pr[D = d ∧ unveil d] ≥ 1
4
for at
least one value of d. Hence, the security requirement cannot hold for any ε < 1
4
.
It is clear that register C determines the commitment value and if C was a
classical register the protocol would satisfy the strongly-binding definition. However,
since C is a quantum register kept in a coherent superposition, it does not have a
well-defined value. We cannot think of the value of the commitment as a classical
random variable and no meaningful definition ofD is possible. In the next section we
show that this feature makes the scheme unsuitable for the canonical construction.
A.2 Consequences for the canonical construction
The canonical construction requires Bob to generate random BB84 states and send
them to Alice, who measures every incoming state in a random basis (computational
or Hadamard). After all the states have been measured Bob announces the basis he
used for every state. If Alice has followed the protocol she has learnt (on average)
half of the (logical) bits. Note that Bob does not know which bits she has learnt.
An obvious problem with this construction comes from the fact that Alice can
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store the quantum states and only measure them once the basis information is
available. In this way she will learn the entire string, which renders the scheme
completely insecure.
To defeat this cheating strategy Alice is required to prove that she has really
measured all the systems by making a certain commitment. More specifically, for
every received BB84 state she is required to commit two bits: the basis used and
the outcome observed.
Later Bob asks Alice to open commitments corresponding to a random subset of
the rounds. He expects that whenever she claims to have measured in the correct
basis, she should have obtained the correct outcome. Classical intuition tells us that
if Alice succeeds on a randomly chosen subset, then the other commitments (with
high probability) must also correspond to honest measurements. In that case we
conclude that she has followed the protocol, the BB84 states have been measured
so the attack described above is no longer a threat.
The classical intuition implicitly assumes that the commitments contain specific
values, which are well-defined regardless of whether the commitment is ultimately
opened or not. This is exactly the notion of classical certification, which is generally
not satisfied in the quantum setting. Here, we show that if the sBGKW scheme is
used in the construction, there exists a quantum cheating strategy for Alice with
the following two properties.
• If Alice is challenged to open the commitment, she can produce statistics
indistinguishable from the honest execution of the protocol.
• If the commitment is not opened and Alice1 and Alice2 are allowed to recom-
bine their systems, they can recover the original BB84 states.
Let |φ〉 = α0|0〉+α1|1〉 be the state that Alice1 has received from Bob and suppose
she stores it in register C. Alice1 picks the measurement basis θ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly
at random and makes an honest commitment to it. If θ = 0 she leaves |φ〉 un-
changed, if θ = 1 she applies a Hadamard transform to it. For simplicity in the
following argument we assume θ = 0 (the case of θ = 1 is analogous). For the
second commitment (to the outcome of the measurement) Alice1 follows the dishon-
est procedure outlined in the previous section and it is easy to verify that at the
commitment point the state is
σX1A2C = 2
−n∑
x
|x〉〈x|X1 ⊗ |α′x,b〉〈α′x,b |A2C ,
where
|α′x,b〉A2C = α0|x〉A2|0〉C + α1|x⊕ b〉A2|1〉C . (A.3)
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If Alice2 is challenged to unveil this round, she honestly unveils the basis information
(θ = 0), while for the second commitment she simply measures her system in the
computational basis and obtains the correct string to unveil d with probability at
least |αd|2. It is easy to see that identical statistics would be obtained if Alice1 made
a measurement in the computational basis at the beginning and honestly committed
to the classical outcome. Picking θ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random leads to statistics
which is indistinguishable from honestly measuring in a random basis.
On the other hand, if the commitment is not opened we can still recover the
original state. Conditional on X1 = x and B = b the state on A2C is |α′x,b〉A2C given
by Eq. (A.3). Note that C is with Alice1 while A2 is with Alice2 but if we bring the
systems together we can apply a unitary U bA2C (as in Eq. (A.2) except that it acts
on A2 instead of A1) to obtain
U bA2C |α′x,b〉A2C = α0|x〉A2|0〉C + α1|x〉A2|1〉C = |x〉A2 ⊗ |φ〉C .
Therefore, we have recovered the original state.
It is interesting to note that in this procedure the state |φ〉 received by Alice1
becomes “delocalised” between Alice1 and Alice2 at the commitment point. In other
words, Alice1 cannot recover it by acting on her own subsystem alone. This is
not surprising as Alice1 through the procedure has in some sense allowed Alice2
to remotely perform a measurement on |φ〉 so in order to reconstruct it we must
combine the two systems together.
Since in the relativistic setting all communication constraints are temporary we
cannot prohibit Alice1 and Alice2 from recovering the original state at some later
point and once the basis information is available, they will perform the right mea-
surement to obtain the correct outcome. Therefore, no uncertainty can be guar-
anteed on the rounds that have not been opened, which renders the construction
completely insecure.
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